

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

OCTOBER, 1971

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# Current History

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# Current History

OCTOBER, 1971

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*How strong is the Soviet Union? In this issue, eight specialists evaluate the foreign policies and the domestic situation of the U.S.S.R. Writing of Soviet-American relations, our introductory article notes that "The two powers are nowhere near the point where they can discuss on a broad basis how to limit and reconcile their interests . . . in the interest of greater security for both and for the rest of the world, nor would all welcome as an unmixed blessing an arrangement that looked like a Soviet-American condominium."*

## Soviet-American Relations

By JOHN C. CAMPBELL

*Senior Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

WHAT IS THE FOCUS, in this third year of President Nixon's "era of negotiation," for estimating the state of Soviet-American relations? Does the classic "Soviet threat" still lie at the beginning and the end of America's concerns about national security and foreign policy? The public, in large part, wants to believe that the cold war is over. The skeptical school of thought notes that the Soviet government continues to depict Soviet policies as devoted to the struggle with American imperialism. President Richard Nixon's administration espouses a practical middle course. It negotiates on issues where the Kremlin has decided that negotiation is useful. It tries to hold its ground on others where there is no such Soviet position to seek agreements. It points with alarm to other issues where the two powers are in danger of open conflict.

The picture is thus mixed. Negotiations on strategic weapons (SALT) go forward with a reasonable chance of agreement. Détente is again in fashion in Europe, but

many political problems on which a true détente depends remain unresolved. The Soviets talk about the desirability of getting a settlement in the Middle East but will not play a constructive part in reaching one. The two powers are nowhere near the point where they can discuss on a broad basis how to limit and reconcile their interests in various parts of the world in the interest of greater security for both and for the rest of the world, nor would all welcome as an unmixed blessing an arrangement that looked like a Soviet-American condominium.

A congress of the Soviet Communist party always provides a convenient vehicle to allow the leaders to lay down the general propositions that sum up where they are and where they propose to go.

The 24th Congress, held in March, 1971, which confirmed Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's status as first among the leaders, also confirmed the stability—some would say the immobilism—of the regime and its major policies. Brezhnev represents the middle-of-

the-road domestic policies which have characterized the oligarchic rule of the "super-clerks" since they overthrew Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Such a regime might be effective in pursuing foreign policies already marked by success, but it has not shown much imagination either in new adventures or in a rethinking of its relations with the United States.

On the ideological front, Soviet attitudes evident at the 24th Congress were as harsh as ever. It is not possible to say how much the self-confident hard line of the Soviet leaders was due to their conviction that, as the Soviet Union was growing stronger and more assertive in international affairs, the United States was becoming weaker, unable to sustain its position abroad because of protest and failure at home. Not since the 1930's could the Soviets see so much in America's performance to substantiate the old thesis of capitalist crisis. Because that was the picture being drawn by the best Soviet experts on American affairs,<sup>1</sup> there is at least a strong presumption that it affected the thinking of the top leadership.

Policy, however, is made up of decisions. The thesis of the uncompromising struggle against capitalism has been accompanied for many years by another and allegedly equally Leninist thesis of peaceful coexistence between states with differing political and social systems, which also received its due in the main statements of the 24th Congress. The one other factor, often overlooked, is the degree to which Soviet decisions over the years have been reactions to American decisions.

Looking at the background of American policy, one is struck by certain similarities. Here, too, there exists a body of holy writ, which finds its most recent expression in the President's two "state of the world" messages of 1970 and 1971. They attempt to set forth a consistent United States world policy which retains what is essential from an earlier time,

changes old approaches and priorities to new conditions, and generally lowers the American "profile." The "Nixon doctrine" themes—cutting down commitments which require United States forces to fight other nations' wars and stressing the need for friends and allies to do more for the common defense because the burden borne by the United States for so long has become too great—were perhaps the minimum concessions that had to be made to a public aroused over Vietnam and the mounting demands on the federal budget. But they were also a response to changes in the world picture and could not disguise what in the eyes of the world, a change of Soviet leadership, was a contraction of American power.

What the President said about the Soviet Union itself therefore took on added importance. Some time before reaching the White House he had come to believe that in many matters involving danger of war or cooperation for peace the United States had to look to Moscow. In the proclaimed era of negotiation, direct communication with the Soviet government was to be the means of dealing in the large with the unresolved problems of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Europe and other areas.

The experience of two years in office had modified the administration's original optimism with regard to how far and how fast confrontation could be replaced by negotiation. The Nixon administration's view of the Soviet Union as of mid-1971 was much like that of its predecessor.<sup>2</sup> It hoped negotiated settlements; it wished to enlarge the areas of common interest with the Soviet Union but it expected no general détente and slackening of Moscow's efforts to expand Soviet power.

## NEGOTIATING FOR ARMS LIMITATION

The Soviet leadership, following the humiliating experience of the Cuban missile crisis, gave the highest priority to achieving peace with the United States in strategic weapons and substantially reached it by the end of the 1960's. Thus the same question was posed to both countries: was it better to go ahead

<sup>1</sup> See G. A. Arbatov, "Administratsiia Niksona u seredny distantsii," *S.Sh.A.*, August, 1970, pp. 3-16.

<sup>2</sup> For differences in tone between the President's messages of 1970 and 1971, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Half Past Nixon," *Foreign Policy*, Summer, 1971, pp. 6-7.



to even higher stages of an uncontrolled competition, with its mounting dangers and colossal cost, or to try to negotiate limits? It took a long time for the two governments to agree to negotiate, but they finally sat down together in Helsinki in November, 1969.

The first tangible sign that some agreement could be reached was the simultaneous announcement by the two governments on May 20, 1971, that they would concentrate on reaching early agreement on anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM) and on certain measures to limit offensive weapons.<sup>3</sup> It was enough of a positive sign to warrant optimism that an accord of some kind would be reached by the end of the year. Agreement on ABM might be relatively easy; the defensive shield around Moscow might be balanced against a similar shield protecting Washington, or comparable systems defending certain offensive missile sites might be allowed, with all other ABM's ruled out.

Just what SALT would produce by way of detailed treaty might be of less significance than the mere fact of a first agreement on levels of strategic arms. Both sides, of course, had to contemplate the results of failure. A full-scale arms race resumed in the atmosphere of ill feeling attendant upon a breaking off of the negotiations would raise tensions dangerously.

## EUROPE

Related questions possibly subject to parallel negotiation include the reduction of force levels and armaments in Europe and new arrangements for security on that continent. In the mid-1960's, the warming atmosphere of détente in Europe encouraged a revival of such talk, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 quickly cooled it. Then, after a decent interval, the Warsaw Pact countries began renewing their proposal for a European security conference, with an

added reason for doing so—to get Western confirmation of the status quo, including the fait accompli in Czechoslovakia.

Eastern appeals for a security conference, however, were matched by Western proposals for a balanced reduction of force levels in Europe, first put forward at the NATO meeting at Reykjavik in June, 1968.<sup>4</sup> At later meetings in 1970 and 1971 the NATO ministers made the point that a European security conference might be useful if progress could first be made on reduction of forces in Europe and on a Berlin settlement. The Warsaw Pact states rejected the idea of preconditions to holding the conference, but Chairman Brezhnev showed unexpected flexibility when, at the 24th Party Congress, he mentioned the reduction of force levels as a necessary task and, in a speech on May 14, 1971, he said the time had come to start negotiations.<sup>5</sup> The NATO nations welcomed the announcement, but the Soviets did not hurry to begin.

Why all this fencing? For the United States it has long been a vital national interest, shared with the nations of West Europe, that those nations remain free and secure. NATO, the organized expression of that interest, was essential at the time of high tension with the Soviet Union. Now the problem is how to adapt NATO before public support erodes so that it may still provide security and at the same time be helpful in moving Europe toward political settlements which will eventually provide a firmer basis for security.

Soviet aims in Europe, now carried forward under the banner of détente and security, are the reverse: to bring about the eventual withdrawal of American military power, to encourage West European nations to lose interest in NATO, to keep them weak and divided, and bring them to an impotent and controlled neutral status. This latter long-term goal, termed "Finlandization" by some observers, is not publicly proclaimed except by implication. Another set of motives is more immediate and more modest: to hold East Europe within its orbit by winning Western acceptance of the status quo, including the German Democratic Republic.

<sup>3</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, June 7, 1971, 741-742.

<sup>4</sup> Final communiqué, Ministerial Session, issued June 27, 1968.

<sup>5</sup> *24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 30-April 9, 1971: Documents* (Moscow: Novosti, 1971, p. 28); *Pravda*, May 15, 1971.

This purpose lay behind the decision to negotiate the treaty of August 12, 1970, with the Federal Republic of Germany and to enter into talks with the Western powers on Berlin. The chief result of the treaty (and of the West German-Polish treaty of November 20, 1970, and an eventual treaty between the two German states) is to eliminate the reunification of Germany as a practical issue and to certify the territorial status quo.

The first test is Berlin. If a satisfactory solution can be found there,\* then West Germany's treaties with the U.S.S.R. and Poland will be ratified; negotiations on force levels and the European security conference will probably take place; and Europe may enjoy a relative stability unknown since World War II. West Europe has been increasing its trade with both the Soviet Union and East Europe and Washington has now belatedly begun to dismantle the barriers to its trade with the East. The Soviet Union's present desire for a period of relative quiet may be ascribed to a number of reasons. But whatever the relative weight of these reasons, Soviet policy seems to be giving the United States and its West European allies the chance to keep open the channels for future cooperation with the East while working out the not negligible problems which beset the Western community itself.

### THE MIDDLE EAST

In the Middle East region, the former imperial powers, Britain and France, have lost almost all influence, leaving the United States and the Soviet Union in a situation of direct rivalry. The involvement of these two powers on opposing sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict has not only heightened the rivalry but has injected a risk of war into each stage of that conflict. As President Nixon said in a portentous statement on July 1, 1970, the Middle East was a more dangerous area than Southeast Asia because the two superpowers were

in direct confrontation and were therefore flirting with the peril of a major war.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps he was overstating it, but his words were spoken under the shock of a bold Soviet move: the commitment of Soviet combat personnel (missile crews and aircraft pilots) to the active defense of Egypt against the strikes of the Israeli air force.

Much of the danger in the Middle East came from the absence of clearly defined limits between the two alliance systems. The United States had treaty commitments to Greece and Turkey as members of NATO and a less definite commitment to the defense of Iran. But the Soviets, while improving their own relations with those northern tier countries, had bypassed them to move into the eastern Mediterranean and the Arab world where they had established strong military and political positions. They turned an area which for decades had been under Western influence into one of open competition in which the momentum of an ever-increasing Soviet presence threatened established Western positions.

The Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean grew from next to nothing in 1955 to a force which at times reached 60 vessels and by 1971 was a major factor in the balance of power. Although it was still no match for the combat strength of the United States Sixth Fleet, its presence had to be taken into account both as a military instrument and as a political influence on littoral countries. Moreover, as the Soviets gained the use of both naval and air facilities in both Egypt and Syria, they went a long distance toward nullifying the advantage the Sixth Fleet had by virtue of its carrier-based air power. Supplemented by the dominant military position the Soviets gained in Egypt through their combat personnel and some 10,000 advisers there, the growing Soviet naval power challenged both the United States and its NATO allies for whom the Mediterranean was both a frontier and a lifeline for the supply of

The Kremlin's advocacy of the cause of the radical Arab states in the Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab disputes had one purpose: bring the Soviet Union into the Middle East

<sup>6</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, July 27, 1970, p. 113.

\* *Ed. Note:* The draft agreement signed by ambassadors of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Britain and France on September 3, 1971, is a major step in this direction.

nd to keep it there. United States policies of supporting Israel, keeping Arab friends and trying to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement had a number of purposes, but the principal aim was to check the advance of Soviet power into the region. Both powers supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 42 of November 22, 1967, which laid down the principles for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

During the course of 1969, the United States and the U.S.S.R. conducted a bilateral discourse on an Arab-Israeli settlement and at the same time took part in four-power talks with the other two concerned members of the Security Council, Britain and France. The Soviet-American negotiations produced a number of agreed points toward a plan which could be recommended, presumably through U.N. Representative Gunnar Jarring, to the parties. But other points were not settled, and as the negotiations came to their sorry end, the Soviets denied their acceptance of the points the American side considered as ready settled.

The developments of 1970, during which the Israeli-Egyptian battlefield largely determined the pace and character of the diplomacy, drew the two powers into sharper confrontation. Israel's air war provoked A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's call for help to Moscow, which in turn provoked the sending of Soviet combat personnel to Egypt. Then the remarkable success of United States Secretary William Rogers in getting both Egypt and Israel to accept a cease-fire, presumably with the benevolent support of the Soviet Union, seemed to give both sides a breathing space after a period of unpredictable danger. But the benefit to Soviet-American relations was dissipated almost immediately in the controversy over the introduction of Soviet missiles on the Egyptian side in the Suez Canal area. As far as the United States was concerned, this action was a deliberate violation of an agreement by Egypt and the Soviet Union. Although new American arms credits to Israel

eased the situation, the setback to the prospects of Soviet-American negotiation and cooperation was unmistakable.

"Does the Soviet government want a settlement in the Middle East?" is a frequently asked question. Publicly and privately Soviet representatives have given an affirmative answer. But the Soviet Union is determined not to be outflanked on the Arab side. It wants to maintain its military presence in Egypt to preserve a relationship which keeps that country looking to Moscow for political guidance and arms. Much as Moscow wants the Suez Canal open for its own reasons, it does not intend to see the United States succeed in removing the main reason for Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union—the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute.

The Arab-Israeli affair, of course, is not the only play running in the Middle Eastern theater. Elsewhere in the region the Kremlin has also been asserting its interest and its presence. With Turkey it has continued its policy of détente adopted in the mid-1960's, hoping that the downward trend in United States-Turkish relations would push the Turks away from NATO toward neutralism. In the area of the Persian Gulf, the Soviets have combined a cooperative relationship with Iran with continued patronage of Iran's unfriendly neighbor Iraq, which had a revolutionary potential among the small Arab emirates on the Gulf. They gave no indication that Soviet power would somehow move into the gulf when British power made its formal exit before the end of 1971, but there is no question of the liveliness of the Soviet interest.<sup>7</sup>

(Continued on page 245)

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<sup>7</sup> See for background, *The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal* (Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1969).

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*"Study reveals a complex and sophisticated Soviet approach to West Europe in general and selected countries in particular. The leaders of the Kremlin have certainly come a long way from the days of the two-camp theory...."*

## Soviet Policies in West Europe

BY TROND GILBERG

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TODAY, THE SOVIET UNION is engaged in several analytically separate roles as an actor on the international scene. The country is a superpower with global interest and involvement, often in conflict with its chief competitor, the United States. The Kremlin speaks for a regional power with vital interests in both Europe and Asia, spanning substantial parts of the Eurasian continents. And Moscow is a center of world communism and a leader in an international political movement whose interests at times conflict with major requirements and goals of Soviet state interest. The interaction of the three major foreign policy roles has made Soviet approaches to various geographical regions highly complex and varying over time.<sup>1</sup>

Soviet policies towards West Europe since the Czech invasion reflect the complex interaction of these various foreign policy roles. The major goals of the Kremlin in this area since August, 1968, appear to be as follows:

An attempt to reach a global understanding with the United States which would in effect ensure the latter's recognition of the status quo in Europe, including Soviet dominance in the eastern half of that continent.

Efforts to limit and reduce American influence in West Europe.

Attempts to drive a wedge into the West European political and economic alliance sys-

tem by promoting close ties with some countries while keeping others at arm's length, and denouncing them.

Efforts to undermine regional organization in West Europe, especially the E.E.C. and NATO, together with promotion of political neutrality as a viable alternative, especially for the smaller countries of the region.

Continued promotion of the Soviet Union as a European power facing problems and prospects common to all European countries in distinction to the "Atlantic" interests of the United States.

In addition to these major Soviet state interests, the ruling Communist party of the Soviet Union [C.P.S.U.] is involved in a complicated effort to maintain some control over the national Communist parties in West Europe without alienating the increasingly nationalistic leaderships of those parties. At the same time, Communist party interest must not be allowed to interfere with the major Soviet state goals of foreign policy in the area.

In pursuance of its major goals, the Soviet Union has produced a highly complex foreign policy since the Czech invasion. To promote a global understanding with the United States, Moscow has participated in various bilateral talks, the chief of which are the SALT talks in Vienna and Helsinki. In addition, the Kremlin has been relatively conciliatory in view of continued American involvement in Vietnam; and the Middle East crisis, to some extent kept alive through the

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Vernon V. Aspaturian, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).



remlin's efforts, has nevertheless been prevented from erupting into renewed warfare, virtually due to Soviet remonstrances in Cairo. While the Soviet Union evidently wishes to avoid a major political confrontation with the United States, Moscow nevertheless has decided to engage in forward policies in certain areas of the world. The Egyptian army may have been prevented from renewed warfare by Soviet appeals for caution, but the entire arsenal of modern weaponry now available to Cairo has been supplied by Moscow. There is a considerable Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean, and the armaments industries of the bloc are working overtime to close the military gap between the United States and the Communist superpower. A global understanding with the United States does not prevent attempts to increase Soviet power as long as the repercussions are relatively mild. Continued expansion of Soviet political influence with concomitant reduction in United States power seem to remain overall policy goals in the Kremlin.<sup>2</sup>

### CHARGES OF IMPERIALISM

In Europe, this major Soviet goal takes on a subtler form but is nevertheless clear. Objective conditions in West Europe have to some extent been favorable for such a Soviet venture. There is considerable anti-United States feeling in the area, partly as a result of American involvement in Southeast Asia, partly because of increasing United States economic and cultural might in virtually all West European countries. The Soviet press has continuously pointed to the danger of American economic domination in the area. United States capital export, it is said, is

threatening to ruin domestic industries, making them mere subsidiaries of American monopolies and banking trusts.<sup>3</sup>

As the American balance of payments deficit has continued to grow, Europeans have been sternly reminded that they in effect are functioning as milking cows for transatlantic financiers to help finance the chronically sick United States economy.<sup>4</sup> This publicity effort reached a peak in the fall of 1970 when financial problems in West Europe resulted in the devaluation of the franc, and again in the spring of 1971, when the massive inflow of dollars into West Europe produced a situation in which West Germany decided to let the mark "float" in relation to the dollar, a procedure which was resented in Paris and various other financial centers in Europe.<sup>5</sup>

Charges of United States economic imperialism have been coupled with repeated warnings to the West European governments against becoming mere pawns in Washington's global imperialist strategy. The United States, it is said, is attempting to use the military and economic resources of Western Europe to shore up its weakening power, thus dragging the peace-loving peoples of the area into dangerous adventurism in foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> This Soviet approach is based upon a sophisticated reading of public opinion in West Europe, which is generally hostile to the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese regimes. By contrast, the Soviet press has refrained from an anti-Israeli campaign in its articles directed to West Europe; this would clearly meet with scant support in traditionally pro-Israeli countries.

One of the chief vehicles through which the Soviet leadership attempts to reduce United States influence in Western Europe is the so-called all-European security conference. This idea was first launched officially by the heads of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest, in 1966, and was repeated at the Budapest meeting of the members in March, 1969.<sup>7</sup> The main objective of such a conference, as expressed in the Warsaw Pact communiqué, is to reduce tension in Europe, possibly coupled with troop and armaments reductions on both sides. Both in the Soviet press and in

<sup>2</sup> Leonid Brezhnev's main speech at the Twenty-fourth Congress seemed to indicate such broad policy goals. See *Pravda*, March 31, 1971, pp. 2-3; also, *Izvestia*, March 31, 1971, pp. 2-9.

<sup>3</sup> *Pravda*, January 27, 1970, p. 3; August 5, 1970, p. 4; *Izvestia*, August 14, 1970, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Izvestia*, May 18, 1971, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> E.g., statement by the Soviet government on NATO, printed in *Izvestia*, April 11, 1969, pp. 2; *Pravda*, April 10, 1969, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>7</sup> The proceedings of the meeting were reported *Pravda*, March 18, 1969, p. 1; the front page of that paper also carried the Warsaw Pact Message concerning the security conference of all European countries.

official statements the Kremlin has emphasized the great advantages for all European nations in such a conference. Reduced tension and decreasing armaments costs would enable all the governments in the area to devote more attention to pressing social and economic problems in their respective countries. Increased trade between Eastern Europe and the industrialized West would be of considerable value to both sides; one of the main payoffs for West Europe would be less dependence on the United States in economic matters.<sup>8</sup> Moscow has repeatedly stressed that East European countries and the Soviet Union are modern, industrialized societies which can contribute technology as well as raw materials in a situation of increased trade and cooperation. Such cooperation would presumably also reduce the American technological dominance on the European continent, especially in electronic equipment and computer usage.

Another major aspect of the proposed conference is the Soviet insistence that it must supersede existing West European regional arrangements such as the European Economic Community, or Common Market.<sup>9</sup> The Soviets have been consistently critical of the Common Market, which is depicted as an organization controlled by monopoly capitalism for the purpose of achieving economic and political integration in the West, a process which would inevitably lead to United States domination. NATO and the E.E.C. are characterized as the main stumbling blocs to better political conditions in Europe. Soviet rejection of NATO is a traditional phenomenon.

Of more immediate interest is the Kremlin's

approach to the E.E.C. Moscow has repeatedly stated that the interests of the working classes are inadequately safeguarded by the current arrangements within the Common Market. An all-European conference, on the other hand, would reduce the importance of big business, thus alleviating the plight of the masses. This emphasis is clearly addressed to the countries currently negotiating for membership in the E.E.C. (Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Norway), where considerable skepticism exists, especially over the strong position of large West German firms and banks in the Common Market and the integration attempts sponsored by Bonn in the "inner six."<sup>10</sup> For the Soviet Union, an expanded E.E.C. would be a formidable competitor in trade, and political integration within the structure would drastically reduce the possibility of splitting certain West European countries (especially France) away from the common organization.

Any setback to the E.E.C. is therefore seen as a step forward for the suggested all-European solutions. Thus *Pravda* reported with undisguised glee on the recent controversy between France and West Germany over the proper way to handle the dollar crisis, pointing out the futility of supranational attempts in West Europe and coming down decisively in favor of cooperation between nation states in the area.<sup>11</sup> According to Moscow, a Europe of such nation states, be they bourgeois capitalist or socialist, could achieve much better cooperation for mutual benefit than could be expected from hostile blocs.

This outlook does not involve the dismantling of Soviet hegemony in East Europe, nor will Comecon necessarily be reduced in importance. Soviet political theory is quite explicit in its insistence that relations between socialist countries are qualitatively different from capitalist international relations, and that the interests which keep the East European countries together are truly democratic and beneficial for all parties concerned.<sup>12</sup>

## BILATERAL RELATIONS

Soviet relations with individual countries in West Europe have been tailored to fit the ge-

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, the article by N. Patolichev, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, in *Izvestia*, December 11, 1969, pp. 2-3. See also Brezhnev's statement on foreign policy in Kharkov, reported in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, April 15, 1970, pp. 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> In the sense that the major integrative aspects of the E.E.C. will be reduced, Moscow is not demanding complete dismantling of the Common Market.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, the *Pravda* article, June 3, 1970, p. 4, warning the Scandinavian countries on membership in the Common Market.

<sup>11</sup> E.g., June 23, 1971, p. 5; June 26, 1971, p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of Soviet theory, especially the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Aims in East Europe," *Current History*, October, 1970, pp. 206-211; 244-246.

il goals outlined above. A major aspect such bilateral relations has been Moscow's empty to accord favored treatment to some countries while consistently castigating others. This approach is aimed at splitting the remaining political and economic organizations of West Europe and thus increasing Soviet influence in the area.

One group of West European countries has been accorded very favorable treatment at the Kremlin. During the last three years France and especially Finland fall into this category. Moscow has consistently evaluated each domestic development in a favorable manner and the foreign policy emanating from Paris has also been praised. Progressive political forces in France are seen to be the rise in political influence and power. Thus, Moscow interpreted the municipal elections of early 1971 as favorable. This situation appears in line with actual events insofar as the leftist parties did gain significantly in many areas.

Soviet commentaries on President Georges Pompidou have also generally been quite favorable, and the late President Charles de Gaulle was hailed as a wise statesman who pursued an independent French policy without yielding to United States pressure. The Soviet press eulogized de Gaulle after his death in a fashion seldom accorded a Western statesman.

In addition to such general evaluations of the French scene, the Soviet leadership took concrete tangible steps to strengthen relations with Paris. President Pompidou visited Moscow in October, 1970, and the communiqué issued after the visit emphasized the close cooperation between the two countries in economic and cultural matters. Agreement on

major political questions was also said to exist; this pertained particularly to the need for peaceful solutions in Vietnam and in the Middle East, but both countries also expressed the view that an all-European conference would be of great value. Regular political consultations between the two countries were established in principle.<sup>13</sup>

This favorable coverage of France was also seen on the occasion of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's visit to Paris in mid-1970. Agreements on some basic political questions and continued economic cooperation were the tangible outcomes of the Gromyko visit.

Franco-Soviet relations were further strengthened by the direct economic cooperation taking place under the auspices of a joint commission. The meeting of the commission in Paris in September, 1970, was given considerable coverage in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.<sup>14</sup> A tangible example of this kind of cooperation has been French participation in various Soviet industrial ventures and Soviet assistance in the construction of a French metallurgical plant.

There are several reasons for the favorable evaluation of France which has been in vogue in Moscow. France has been a maverick in NATO for years, frequently castigating United States policies and always resisting increasing American influence on the European continent. Furthermore, French leaders have been the staunchest advocates within the E.E.C. of limited integration among the "inner six"; the Gaullist concept of a Europe of nation states has been instrumental in preventing Great Britain from gaining access to the Common Market.

There are recent signs of a cooling off of relations between the two countries. President Pompidou's meetings with British Prime Minister Edward Heath have in fact opened the doors for British membership in the E.E.C. It is symptomatic that the Soviet press has refrained from detailed commentary on this French political move. Instead, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* now concentrate on factual reporting of meetings in the various E.E.C. committees concerned with British member-

<sup>13</sup> *Pravda* gave extensive coverage to the visit, including the speeches of President Pompidou, Assistant Nikolai V. Podgorny and Premier Alexei N. Kosygin (October 7, 1970, pp. 1, 4). Both *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published the text of the protocol established after Pompidou's visit (October 1970, p. 1) and also the Soviet-French Declaration (October 14, pp. 1-2).

<sup>14</sup> *Pravda*, September 12, 1970, p. 4; *Izvestia*, September 13, 1970, p. 2. *Pravda* on September 1970, p. 21, and *Izvestia*, p. 21, also reported on "recent" session of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers which had approved the work of the Soviet-French Commission.

ship; commentaries primarily discuss the technical difficulties of British entry.

### RELATIONS WITH FINLAND

While the position of France as a most-favored country in West Europe may be somewhat tenuous at the present time, no such doubts can be voiced over the position of Finland in Soviet foreign policy evaluations. Soviet-Finnish relations remain very cordial. Finland has consistently cleared her foreign policy with the Kremlin. The Finnish government has been a major promoter of the all-European conference. After consultations with Moscow, Helsinki torpedoed the Nordök scheme of closer economic cooperation between the Scandinavian countries and Finland,<sup>15</sup> and political leaders in the Finnish capital have been very cautious in their relations with the E.E.C.

In addition to such aspects of close Soviet-Finnish relations, more tangible effects of good neighbor relations have been produced. The Soviet-Finnish Friendship Treaty of 1949 was extended for another twenty years, beginning in July, 1970.<sup>16</sup> In April, 1971, an extensive economic pact was signed, which called for close cooperation and trade.

Soviet relations with a second group of countries can best be categorized as "favorable, but with certain misgivings." Moscow generally evaluates the policies of these countries as "realistic," with contributions to European peace and security, but the existence of undesirable elements and tendencies are pointed out. In this category can be found the neutralist countries of Sweden, Austria and Switzerland, as well as Italy and, very tenuously, West Germany since the federal elections of 1969.

Italy's position in this category has been due

largely to the relatively strong economic relations between Moscow and Rome. Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Italy in November 1970, produced little more than general statements on the need for increased cooperation in Europe. The communiqué issued after talks stressed the need for careful preparations before an all-European conference called, and the document specifically stated that the U.S. and Canadian participation in the conference was welcomed.<sup>17</sup>

In the spring and early summer of 1971, Soviet press began to give more coverage to domestic political conditions in Italy, because of the campaign for the municipal elections held in June. The results of the elections represented solid progress for the Communist party of Italy, a substantial setback for the Christian Democrats, and massive gains for the neo-fascists. In a major commentary on June 30, 1971, *Pravda* pointed to the gains of the left as a progressive sign, but voiced concern over the rise of neo-fascism. It maintained that polarization continues in Italy; hopefully the progressive forces in the country will be strengthened in the process that Italy can represent peace and progress in Europe.<sup>18</sup>

The neutral countries have been praised for their nonalignment. Both Switzerland and Austria have nevertheless been admonished to observe neutrality in a strict fashion; the Austrians were criticized for letting West German monopolies infiltrate the Austrian economy and also for permitting the movement of NATO weaponry through the country, while the Swiss were castigated for a military inactivity which was based on a hypothetical threat to Switzerland from the east.<sup>19</sup> The incidents were of relatively minor significance, and Soviet relations with these countries continue to be cordial. Austria has nevertheless been the target of several other criticisms concerning faulty observance of neutrality, which clearly signifies Soviet concern over the Western orientation of Vienna.

Sweden has been praised for her neutral support of the proposed all-European conference and her strong stand against American involvement in Southeast Asia.

<sup>15</sup> Reported extensively and with regret in the Scandinavian press, e.g., in March and April, 1970, and frequently commented upon later, see *Arbeiderbladet* (Oslo) December 31, 1970, p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> The treaty was reproduced in *Pravda*, July 21, 1970, pp. 1, 2, 4. The principal speeches at the signing ceremony were also reported.

<sup>17</sup> The joint communiqué was published in both *Pravda*, November 15, 1970, p. 4, and *Izvestia*, same day, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> *Pravda*, June 30, 1971, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, January 30, 1970, p. 4.



at the same time, Moscow has warned that "certain circles" in Sweden are attempting to work out agreements with the E.E.C., and it has generally recognized that Stockholm has a Western orientation in economic affairs. Moscow clearly wishes to limit Sweden's involvement in West European regional economic arrangements.<sup>20</sup>

### WEST GERMANY

Soviet relations with West Germany have undergone drastic changes during the period since the Czech invasion. Prior to the Bundestag elections of 1969, West Germany was seen as the chief adversary of the Soviet Union in Europe. Bonn was accused of neo-fascism, revanchism, and imperialistic designs in East Europe; the Federal Republic was also seen as the chief promoter of United States imperialism on the continent.<sup>21</sup> The Soviet anti-German campaign reached a crescendo in the fall of 1968, when Bonn was accused of activities designed to destroy socialism in Czechoslovakia. This campaign has been well documented elsewhere.<sup>22</sup>

The victory of the Social Democrats in the 1969 federal elections brought to the chancellorship in Bonn a man who was to inaugurate a major change in West German foreign policy. Willy Brandt became the chief promoter of the "New Ostpolitik," which in essence meant a drastic departure from previous approaches to East Europe. While former West German leaders had maintained that East Germany was a hybrid, a temporary aberration of postwar politics, Brandt soon showed his willingness to recognize the de facto existence of the East German regime,

although he was not yet willing to recognize it *de jure*. The new Chancellor also promoted a flexible approach to the other East European countries, among them Poland; in the spring of 1971 the treaty between Poland and the Federal Republic in effect recognized the Oder-Neisse border, thus paving the way for distinctly better relations between these traditional adversaries. The new Ostpolitik could not fail to have ramifications for Soviet-West German relations.

The Kremlin was at first extremely cautious in its evaluations of the new leadership in Bonn. As Brandt proceeded to carry out some of his pledges concerning the new Ostpolitik, he was characterized as "realistic" in foreign policy; it was said that his main policies were contributing to reduced tensions and better understanding in Europe. Various economic agreements were established; in one case West Germany was to deliver large-dimension steel pipe to the Soviet Union, while the Soviets agreed to deliver natural gas to the Federal Republic. Increased trade in other commodities was also advocated.

Economic cooperation was followed by political talks which climaxed in the visit of Willy Brandt to Moscow for the initialing of the Soviet-West German treaty in August, 1970.<sup>23</sup>

Even during the heyday of closer relations, the Soviet leadership voiced misgivings about certain aspects of political life in the Federal Republic. German political parties which had voiced strong opposition against the treaty with Moscow were castigated as "reactionary," and later even as "neo-nazi" and a remnant of the past which must be relegated to the dustbin of history.<sup>24</sup>

As the months have passed since the initialing of the Soviet-West German Treaty without final ratification in the Bundestag, Soviet views on Bonn's policies have become cooler. Soviet leaders have repeatedly demanded that West Germany recognize East Germany as a separate state. Only such recognition, it has been said, would improve relations between Bonn and Moscow. A similar caution was present in Moscow's evaluation of the Polish-

<sup>20</sup> *Pravda*, June 20, 1970, pp. 1, 4; *Izvestia*, June 20, 1970, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, September 1, 1968, p. 3; *Pravda*, September 17, 1968, p. 5; September 20, p. 5; September 23, 1968, p. 4; September 30, 1968, p. 4; October 4, 1968, p. 4.

<sup>22</sup> Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Aims in East Europe," *Current History*, October, 1970, pp. 206-1, 244-246.

<sup>23</sup> See the extensive coverage of the Scheel and Brandt visits in Moscow and the initialing of the treaty, *Pravda*, August 13, 1970, pp. 1-2, and August 14, p. 1; *Izvestia*, August 13, pp. 1-2 and August 14, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, *Pravda*, July 14, 1970, p. 5; February 13, 1971, p. 4, and February 18, p. 5.



West German treaty; this document was once again seen as a major step forward, and it was hoped that the realistic foreign policy of Willy Brandt would be manifested in his relations with other countries, notably East Germany.

In the meantime, Brandt has asked Washington to maintain its troop strength in Europe, and he has furthermore insisted on Soviet discussions of West Berlin before ratification of the Soviet-West German Treaty. He has also called for both party and government meetings in West Berlin despite Soviet and East German protests. All these actions have contributed to greater Soviet skepticism vis-à-vis Bonn and Willy Brandt.

Despite the cooling of relations, Moscow is unlikely to return to hostility in relations with West Germany. The treaty of 1970 in essence established West German recognition of the status quo in East Europe and Bonn's acceptance of Soviet hegemony in that area. The tacit recognition of East Germany was also important in this context. The treaty was a tangible gain for Moscow, and only Willy Brandt can deliver the policies needed to fulfill such gains. Moscow will therefore probably be careful not to alienate him. But the reconciliation between the two countries is tenuous and is essentially based on German concessions. Should the Brandt Cabinet fall as a result of the new Ostpolitik, the shaky improvement in Bonn-Moscow relations is likely to turn once again into chilly hostility. Perhaps the recent Soviet willingness to discuss the Berlin problem seriously, including improved land transport facilities for West Berlin, indicates Moscow's understanding of Brandt's difficult position.

The two NATO members, Denmark and Norway, are the subjects of an ambiguous evaluation by Moscow. The governments of the two countries continue to support NATO, and a generally Western orientation prevails among most of the political elites. This has resulted in Soviet criticisms for "kowtowing"

to United States imperialism. At the same time, the Kremlin clearly views the major policy makers in the Scandinavian countries as relatively "progressive" in foreign policy. The two countries have been praised for their interest in the all-European security conference, and their official criticisms of United States policies in Southeast Asia have been welcomed in Moscow. But Danish and Norwegian leaders have applied for membership in the Common Market, and this has not been received favorably in the Soviet capital.

This ambiguity is replaced by a strongly positive evaluation of certain political movements in the two countries which are in essence anti-E.E.C. coalitions. The anti-E.E.C. movement is especially strong in Norway, where a broad coalition of conservative farmers, some left-wing Laborites, and part of the Social Democratic rank and file have joined hands with leftist parties such as the Norwegian Communist party and the Socialist People's party and various other groups of the left wing in opposition to Norwegian membership in the Common Market. As the E.E.C. controversy intensifies in Norway in anticipation of the planned referendum on the matter, Moscow will undoubtedly continue its support of the anti-E.E.C. movement without going so far as to alienate the pro-E.E.C. Social Democratic leaders in power.

Several countries have experienced severe criticism from Moscow throughout the period under examination. In this category can be found West Germany prior to September, October, 1969; Spain, Portugal and Greece. It is hardly surprising that the colonels' regime in Athens and the authoritarian governments in Madrid and Lisbon are criticized by Moscow; many governments in West Europe, and a substantial portion of European public opinion share this evaluation.

Of more interest is the fact that Britain seems to fall into the same unfavorable category. The Labour government of Harold Wilson was seen as no different from Conservative administrations; in both cases, Britain is seen to have acted as Washington's "Trojan Horse" in Europe, a faithful ally of United States expansionism which has doubled in some imperialism of its own. Af-

<sup>25</sup> See, for example, the resolution adopted at the 1969 World Conference of Communist Parties, reported extensively in the Soviet press, in *Pravda*, June 18, 1969, pp. 1-4, and also *Izvestia* (same day, pp. 1-4).

he Conservative election victory in 1970 the Soviet reaction was highly unfavorable and predicted continuation and expansion of Labour's reactionary policies. Especially strongly criticized were the British decisions to continue the British military presence east of Suez, and weapons sales to South Africa. Britain's attempt to enter the Common Market was evaluated as further proof that Whitehall was acting as Washington's lackey, and the "inner six" were warned against the danger of British membership in the continental union.

An interesting change in Soviet evaluations of Britain took place during the spring of 1971. The rapprochement between London and Paris, exemplified by Prime Minister Edward Heath's visit to French President Pompidou and the improved prospects for British membership in the E.E.C. stemming from that meeting, have necessitated a sophisticated Soviet approach to London. Considerable attention has been paid to the sizable financial contribution which Britain must make to the common fund of the E.E.C. and the rising prices which will result from British membership.

The possibility of British membership in the continental economic organization has also brought renewed Soviet interest in the left-wing forces in Britain, especially in some of the trade unions whose position on E.E.C. membership is strong disapproval.

The controversy in Britain over E.E.C. membership is likely to be long and the outcome is in no way certain. Should the Cabinet obtain British access to the Common Market, relations between Moscow and London will probably become frigid once more. On the other hand, current public opinion in the British Isles prevails over the Cabinet's desire to join the "inner six," the Conservative government will suffer a major setback, and Moscow will then have the option of turning its attention to Britain as a potential friend of the Soviet Union in West Europe.

Soviet evaluations of political life in West Europe, as expressed officially and in the major press organs, are not necessarily a valid measure of real Soviet views. Objective po-

litical conditions in Sweden, for example, are probably more favorable for the realization of major Soviet foreign policy goals than is the case in France; the all-European conference has broad backing in traditionally neutralist Sweden, while strong forces on the French right are skeptical of Soviet approaches in the field. Anti-Americanism is possibly also stronger in Sweden than in certain political circles in France, whose government remains within NATO, although it does not directly participate in military activities in that organization. Objective conditions would therefore demand "most favored" evaluations of Sweden as well as of France, yet a survey of the Soviet press yields a distinct impression of more favorable comments about Paris.

The reason for this discrepancy is clear. France is a pivotal country in West Europe. Soviet foreign policy goals in that area will be given a considerable boost if France can be enticed away from participation in Western alliance systems and economic cooperation. Sweden, although important strategically and in other fields, is traditionally neutralist, and is thus in a favorable position already.

The same factors apply to the very unfavorable evaluation of Great Britain so often found in the Soviet press. Objective relations between Whitehall and the Kremlin are better than one would expect from reading *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.

Nevertheless, used with some caution, press sources give a general view of the major trends of Soviet evaluations in foreign policy matters. Study reveals a complex and sophisticated Soviet approach to West Europe in general and selected countries in particular. The leaders of the Kremlin have certainly come a long way from the days of the two-camp theory, with its stale ideologized views of a world dominated by big capital or by peace-loving socialists. The increasingly sophisticated foreign policy analysis taking place in the Kremlin represents a serious challenge to Western diplomats.

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“... Soviet policy in East Europe today can be said to be more tutelary than imperious, and Soviet problems in the area are those of an unpopular and resented guardian.”

## Soviet Tutelage in East Europe

BY CHARLES GATI

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FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER suppressing the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and three years after crushing the Czechoslovak experiment in a more humane form of socialism, the Soviet position in East Europe remains precarious.<sup>1</sup>

As seen from the West, the East European countries are no longer the “satellites” they were under Stalin; diversity in the region has created several versions of “communism”; independent or semi-independent policies have made the once appropriate labels of “Soviet bloc” or “Soviet orbit” anachronistic; serious debates over Marxist-Leninist ideology, as well as its many applications, have even led to questions about the propriety of

the term “Communist world.” As seen by the Soviet Union, on the other hand, Soviet East European relations can be understood in terms of a “socialist commonwealth,” in which policies are presumably coordinate among more or less equal nation-states—characterization made inappropriate by the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 which reaffirmed and justified the Soviet Union’s right of intervention in East Europe.<sup>2</sup> That doctrine was then and remains today a gruesome reminder of the Soviet desire for hegemony and of the limits on East European independence.

To be sure, the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia and the subsequent Soviet intervention culminating in the Brezhnev Doctrine reveal only one aspect of Soviet-East European relationships. The other aspect of that relationship has received less attention in the West because of its less spectacular, less dramatic nature—that aspect being the slow evolving change in Soviet-East European relations reflected not in East European autonomy, but in the grudging Soviet acceptance of different models of, or paths to, socialism. In addition, the Soviet Union has come to tolerate, also grudgingly, East European maneuverings in foreign policy, especially in foreign economic policies. Thus, Soviet policy in East Europe today can be said to be more tutelary than imperious, and Soviet problems in the area are those of an unpopular and resented guardian.

The present Soviet position is in sharp contrast with the era of Soviet hegemony

<sup>1</sup> This article is based in part on my unpublished paper, “External and Internal Restraints on East European Foreign Policies: An Analytical Scheme,” read at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles, September, 1970. The definitive study of Soviet-East European relations and of East European politics in the 1940’s and 1950’s is Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1961). For a more recent country-by-country series, see the “Integration and Community Building in Eastern Europe” series published by the Johns Hopkins Press under the general editorship of Jan F. Triska.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Kazimierz Grzybowski, *The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations & Institutions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Jan F. Triska, ed., *Communist Party-States: Comparative and International Studies* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); Kurt L. London, “The ‘Socialist Commonwealth of Nations,’” *Orbis*, III, 4 (Winter, 1960), 424-442. The Soviet view of Soviet-East European relations is treated in *Voprosy vneshnei politiki stran sotsialisticheskogo lagera*, Moscow, 1958.

ring the Stalin period. Lasting from 1944–45 to the mid-1950's, the Stalinist phase was characterized by its simplicity in the sense that the Soviet Union issued detailed instructions and directions to the leaders of East Europe who, in turn, implemented them. Leaders like Boleslaw Bierut of Poland, Klement Gottwald of Czechoslovakia, Matyas Rakosi of Hungary, or Walter Ulbricht of East Germany the Soviet word was sacred; Soviet policies were always correct and applicable; and Stalin's wisdom was beyond the slightest doubt. They diligently took their cues from Moscow so that differences between Soviet and East European political patterns and priorities were of minor significance. The only significant exception was Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito who, as a result of his more independent, national political course, was condemned as a deviationist and for all practical purposes was expelled from the Communist movement in 1948–1949.

Short of invasion, the Soviet Union applied conceivable pressure on Yugoslavia, including economic boycott, military maneuvers, vicious propaganda campaigns and threatening border incidents. What was revealed in the process, however, was the ability of an East European regime to withstand Soviet pressures and pursue an independent, albeit socialist or Communist, political course. The example of Yugoslavia subsequently became the major foreign influence on Imre Nagy's Hungary in 1956, Nicolae Ceausescu's Rumania, and Alexander Dubček's Czechoslovakia in 1968; in fact, the post-revolutionary Janos Kádár regime in Hungary and the post-Wladyslaw Gomulka regime of Poland have also looked to the USSR for inspiration as much as they have looked to Moscow for guidance.

### POLITICAL VARIETY

Importantly, then, the Soviet Union has come to live with a variety of political re-

gimes and attitudes in East Europe.<sup>3</sup> Although Yugoslavia's future as a multi-nation entity might be endangered by Tito's forthcoming retirement, the country's course has been at least implicitly accepted by all post-Stalin Soviet leaders. Kádár, whose Hungary is now second only to Yugoslavia in economic experimentation and political tolerance, apparently enjoys full Soviet support. In Poland, Gierek follows policies which increasingly resemble those of Kádár's Hungary, and the Soviet leadership is presumably as pleased with his direction as it was instrumental in his promotion.

Soviet ties with Ceausescu's Rumania are less harmonious, but—barring such unexpected developments as formal Rumanian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact or from COMECON, or further deviation from Soviet foreign policy toward Israel or China—the present uneasy relationship should not lead to direct or, for that matter, indirect Soviet intervention. On the contrary, the Soviet Union might well come to appreciate Rumania's usefulness as a link between Moscow and Peking and perhaps even between Moscow and Washington.

Elsewhere in the region—in Bulgaria, post-1968 Czechoslovakia, and post-Ulbricht East Germany—the party leaders deviate little if at all from Soviet policies and thus cause no appreciable concern for the Kremlin. Indeed, the relative ease with which the Gustav Husak regime was installed in Czechoslovakia (at least in terms of Western acquiescence) and his subsequent success in stifling dissent and reestablishing party authority must have confirmed to the Soviet leadership the correctness of the 1968 decision to use force against the Dubček experiment. A traditional ally in the Balkans, Bulgaria is so accommodating to the Soviet Union that she can be, and is, used to air Soviet views. Finally, unlike its rigid and stubborn predecessor regime of Walter Ulbricht, the Honecker regime in East Germany appears inclined to fall in line with the somewhat more flexible Soviet policy toward West Germany, thus removing the major obstacle to the prospect of limited accommodation between Bonn and

<sup>3</sup> A case in point are the diverse East European reactions to the issue of European security. For a most informative treatment of the subject, see Wolfgang Klaiber, "Security Priorities in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism*, XIX, 3 (May-June, 1970), 32–44.

Moscow as well as between Bonn and other East European capitals.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY

The beginnings of change in Soviet policy toward East Europe—leading to its present tolerance of regional diversity—can be traced to the death of Stalin in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev's dramatic visit to Yugoslavia in 1955, and the ideological amplification of early 1956 expressed in the notion of "different paths to socialism." It was not until the fall of 1956, however, in the chaotic atmosphere of the Hungarian and Polish revolts, that the Soviet government felt it necessary to legitimize and define its new relationship with East Europe, stressing in an official statement the principle of equality.

The Soviet government [the statement declared] is ready to discuss with the governments of other socialist countries measures for the development and strengthening of the economic ties between socialist countries, in order to remove any possibilities of violating the principles of national sovereignty, national advantage, and equality in economic relations.<sup>4</sup>

The search for a new formula of interstate relations—from the arbitrary, *ad hoc* arrangements of the Stalin era to a routinized relationship—led to the notion of a "socialist commonwealth" and to a series of new multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements between the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe, on the one hand, and among the various East European countries, on the other.

In addition, existing relationships were formalized, institutionalized or revived—the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance

(COMECON), the Danubian Commission, the Organization for International Cooperation of Railway Administrations and others. Concurrently, East Europe obtained a large degree of internal autonomy for experimentation; indeed, departure from Soviet patterns of governance, in economic and in political matters, became a common feature, if not the defining norm, of East European political life.

### LIMITS OF AUTONOMY

No advocate of the emerging diversity, the Soviet Union nonetheless seemed willing to tolerate it on two conditions. First, the Soviet Union insisted that its junior partners consistently support Soviet foreign policy, including Soviet policy towards China. Second, the Soviet Union insisted that no East European country promote its experiments or patterns as a "new model" of socialism to be followed by others beyond its frontiers. Such were the Soviet-imposed limits on the autonomy of East Europe in this more mature, institutionalized phase of development after 1956, a phase during which "the Soviet Union continued to exercise leadership, acknowledged at the November, 1957, conference of the Communist parties and buttressed Soviet international and technological prestige," while at the same time "more elaborate mechanisms and processes of cohesion" were being developed.<sup>5</sup>

Since the mid-1960's—the third phase of Soviet-East European relations—the countries of East Europe have on occasion rejected or at least violated the two limits of their autonomy set by the Soviet Union. As to the first, most East European regimes violated the Soviet foreign policy line during the course of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. Rumania, of course, simply refused to participate in the invasion. Hungary contributed only a token force and strongly hinted at her disagreement with the action taken. East Germany and Poland, on the other hand—still led at the time by Ulbricht and Gomulka, respectively—seemed more antagonistic, more volatile and more zealous than the Soviet Union itself. Only Bulgaria appeared to have followed faithfully the z

<sup>4</sup> *Pravda*, October 31, 1956.

<sup>5</sup> Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

<sup>6</sup> Analytical treatments of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and its consequences for East Europe include Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Aftermath of the Czech Invasion," *Current History*, November, 1968, pp. 263–267, 305–310; R. V. Burks, "The Decline of Communism in Czechoslovakia," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, January, 1969, pp. 21–49; G. R. Urban, "Eastern Europe After Czechoslovakia," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, *ibid.*, pp. 50–68; Fritz Ermarth, *Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964–1968* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, March, 1969).



rag course of Soviet policy. To the extent that such divergent East European approaches are neither unique nor accidental, Soviet foreign policy can no longer be said to be heeded automatically by the East European regimes.

As to the second Soviet-imposed limitation, the sanctity of the Soviet model of socialism has also been challenged, if one considers the increasing scope of experimentation and innovation in the area particularly in the economic realm, and the pride with which some of the new models or policies are announced. (To be sure, East European politicians and commentators always publicly underemphasize the novelty of their models and emphatically reject foreign commentary pointing to East European divergence from the Soviet model<sup>7</sup>—so emphatically, in fact, that these denials serve only to call attention to the new policy or the novel approach.)

Thus the East European regimes have successfully removed themselves from their satellite status of the late 1940's and early 1950's. They have also found the institutional ties of the second or post-Stalin phase restraining, though no longer always binding; they now consider Soviet policy as a guideline, albeit a compelling one, to be followed when it serves their own perspectives, needs, or interests. Although the policies of East Europe seem to effect a desire to adopt only those Soviet-sponsored guidelines which advance specific national objectives, they are carefully formulated to avoid embarrassing, alienating, or confronting Big Brother next door.

Accordingly, the East European regimes have lately begun to respond to some of the same pressures and restraints other small or medium-size countries must take into account in the formulation and implementation of their foreign policies. Soviet-East European relations have reached a third phase of development, characterized as before by legal-institutional ties, Soviet tutelage and persistent and often successful East European attempts to circumvent periodic Soviet hegemonical endeavors. Consequently, Soviet-

East European relations now involve constant reappraisals of the limits and nature of autonomy and authority, delicate balancing, intricate maneuverings and considerations of alternative courses of action. To borrow a phrase used by Stephen Kertesz in a different context, foreign policy for both East Europe and the Soviet Union now denotes "diplomacy in a whirlpool."

Where does the present precarious situation leave the Soviet leadership?

It is fair to assume that the Soviet leadership has come to accept the end of an era during which East Europe was forcefully linked with the Soviet Union. It is also fair to assume, however, that it is disturbed by important trends toward autonomy and independence, and is unwilling to let go. Therefore, its policies are complex, as the leadership seeks to steer a course between subjugation and independence: return to the Stalinist past would only create more tension and trouble, while East European independence—on the pattern of either Yugoslavia or Finland—is both ideologically and strategically unacceptable. Ideological opposition to autonomy is based on the view that there is a common core of interests among socialist countries, while strategic opposition is founded on the fear of West Germany and on the belief in the continued importance of conventional warfare.

If one assumes, however, that West Germany is neither desirous nor strong enough

(Continued on page 243)

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<sup>7</sup> See, for example, József Horváth, "Egynémelyek tévedéseiről" ("The Erroneous Ideas of Some people"), *Népszabadság*, July 26, 1970.

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*"In comparison with their optimistic perceptions in the 1960's, the Soviets now find themselves driven to the view that China may be a permanent threat on Soviet borders in Asia and a permanent rival elsewhere."*

## Sino-Soviet Relations: The View from Moscow

BY JOHN R. THOMAS

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THE SOVIET UNION'S deteriorating relations with Communist China have transformed these relations into the number one problem of Soviet foreign policy today. This development has been made more evident in the Soviet view by the contrasting behavior of the other major rivals of the Soviet Union. Under the pressures generated by the war in Vietnam the United States is currently reducing its presence abroad, thus further minimizing the chances for confrontation with the Soviet Union; moreover, the United States is involved in direct negotiations with the Soviet Union on such critical issues as strategic arms limitation looking toward a possible *modus vivendi*, at least in the military field. West Germany is currently engaged in a conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union under *Ostpolitik*, her new Eastern policy. And Japan is not actively challenging the Soviet Union at present, although her potential for doing so is great.

Only Communist China has persistently been pursuing her challenge to Soviet interests since the Sino-Soviet dispute erupted in the early 1960's. Indeed, China escalated her challenge to the level of openly acknowledged armed clashes at regimental or higher strength in 1969. These clashes dramatically symbolize the dimensions of China's challenge: since World War II no other country, including the United States at the height of

the cold war, has pushed its differences with the Soviet Union to the point of open force. This Chinese challenge has come at a time when Soviet military power has grown to near parity with the United States, the number one military power in the world.

Moreover, from an ideological viewpoint it is ironic that the only post-World War II military clashes directly involving Soviet forces have been with China, a one-time Communist ally. This development has profoundly shaken the faith of "the true believers." According to Marxist-Leninist ideology, internecine war could occur only within the capitalist world, torn asunder by internal contradictions and deadly rivalries; the Communist world was allegedly immune to such strife because it was united by a common ideology.

As the Soviet leadership now appraises its dispute with China against this background it finds paradoxically that the recent tremendous growth of Soviet military power has at the same time been accompanied by weakening in the Soviet political position vis-a-vis China. This has further deepened Soviet concern. In comparison with the optimistic perceptions in the 1960's, the Soviets now find themselves driven to the view that China may be a permanent threat on Soviet borders in Asia and a permanent rival elsewhere. This judgment contrasts with the earlier expressed Soviet view that "some non-Maoist elements, presumably center-

round the so-called pragmatists headed by Premier Chou En-lai, would prevail over Chairman Mao Tse-tung, correct his errors, and restore the unity of purpose and action that seemingly obtained in the halcyon days of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This Soviet hope, however, has been shattered by the outcome of the Great Cultural Revolution: this upheaval surfaced the number one pragmatist, Premier Chou, as a major formulator, as well as the chief executor, of current Chinese policy; yet this development produced no basic change in China's deep-seated hostility to the Soviet Union. If anything, the Chouist pragmatists are now perceived by Soviet leaders to be more dangerous than the seemingly more fanatic Maoist ideological purists who were in command of China's policy at the height of the Cultural Revolution. At least these Maoist adherents created internal disarray that sapped China's strength and diverted her attention from single-mindedly pursuing her hostility.

The Soviet loss of hope for reversal of the ruthlessly hostile anti-Soviet policy by pragmatists like Chou was reflected at the 24th Party Congress held earlier this year: China's hostility was no longer attributed solely to Mao and his clique," as was the case earlier, but to the Chinese leadership as a whole.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the Soviet perception of a fundamentally hostile China, more dangerous because she is now led by the pragmatist Chou, was reflected at the 24th Congress. Premier Leonid Brezhnev was forced to abandon the ideological context and bluntly to assert in traditional power terms the Soviet determination to defend Soviet national interests at all costs against any Chinese encroachment; he did so despite reported pressures by non-Soviet parties to keep the China issue out of the proceedings. Brezhnev's assessment was reinforced by Marshal A. A. Grechko, the Soviet Defense Minister, who grimly declared that any aggressor who violated Soviet

borders would be severely punished. Since only the Chinese have deliberately and massively violated Soviet-conceived borders in the post-World War II period, Grechko's warning had only one intended foe in mind.

The fact that both Brezhnev and Grechko had to make their harsh judgments this year, several years after the Great Cultural Revolution came to an end, and after Chou, the pragmatist, began to govern China on a day-to-day basis (a period during which the Ussuri River clashes nevertheless occurred) indicates a Soviet estimate that no significant change in the magnitude of the China threat has taken place or is likely to occur in the near future. Indeed, the threat may grow because, with the end of the internal disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution and with the pragmatists once more in command, the Chinese will be able more effectively to husband and use their resources in order to pursue the challenge to the Soviets single-mindedly.

This underlies Moscow's concern as it looks at its weakened political position today vis-à-vis China both inside and outside the Communist world. Within the Communist world, the 24th Party Congress revealed that the Soviets could not muster sufficient support of the foreign parties represented at the meeting even for verbal condemnation of China for her actions in "splitting" the unity of the Communist world and further undermining Soviet authority. Some key parties, including the heretofore docile French and East German parties, pointedly passed over Sino-Soviet relations in silence even as Soviet speakers from Brezhnev down urgently hinted at the need to condemn the Chinese. Other key parties, such as Italy's and Rumania's, failed to follow the Soviet lead or remained silent, and also argued explicitly for the right of each party to follow an independent path and argued against imposition by any party of its views on another party. This was a clear reference to the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia in 1968, and to any potential action against China. This brought home to the Soviet Union the deterioration in its position within the Communist world: in the

<sup>1</sup> The Resolution of the 24th Party Congress, which approved Brezhnev's policies, spoke only of "enmity of 'the Chinese leaders'"; it did not mention Mao or his followers. See also the article Adam Ulam in this issue.

early 1960's the Soviets could consider, and actually maneuvered behind the scenes for, "the expulsion" of China from the Communist ranks.

The Soviet political position vis-a-vis China has also deteriorated in the non-Communist world with the failure of the Soviet effort to isolate China. At its peak, this effort was represented by the Soviet attempt to mobilize the Asian community of nations for a containment of China through Brezhnev's proposal—made in June, 1969, shortly after the Ussuri River clashes—for a collective security agreement in Asia. But this Soviet containment effort has failed as China has resumed her old ties and developed new relationships.

Most important, through ping-pong diplomacy and the projected visit of President Richard Nixon, China has established the basis for a major breakthrough to the United States, thus fueling Soviet concern over possible United States-Chinese "collusion," a possibility which the Soviets have sought to forestall since the eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute. By mellowing her attitude toward the United States, in the Soviet view, China is on the road to removing the two-front politico-military threat from the United States and the Soviet Union; moreover, to the degree that United States-Chinese relations improve, Peking will be able to devote even greater attention to challenging the Soviets on the northern front. The Soviets will then lose the advantage they derived from the earlier Maoist strategic "madness" of simultaneous hostility toward the two superpowers.

Then, too, the potential Sino-United States rapprochement represents a severe blow to Soviet expectations. The shift in United States attitudes toward China with the latter's encouragement signifies, in Soviet eyes, a United States choice of a power balance approach (favoring a weaker China against a stronger Soviet Union) instead of a cultural/racial approach which would call for the United States to join the Soviet Union in containing the "yellow peril." Soviet spokesmen have hinted from time to time about making common cause with the United States

against China, although they have never put the issue in cultural/racial terms.

The Soviet Union's position has been weakened not only by the Chinese emergence from isolation and by China's new policy of laying the groundwork for eliminating the second front posed by the United States but also by Chinese political offensive designed in turn to set up a second front against the Soviets themselves in the West. The most important part of this move is China's renewed effort to instigate or capitalize on dissidence and deviation in East Europe, the most critical area of Soviet concern outside the Soviet Union itself. Until recently, Albania was the lone Chinese outpost on the western flank of the Soviets. Now, however, China is dealing extensively with Rumania and even with Yugoslavia, the latter long bitterly assailed in Peking for "revisionism." For example, high level Rumanian and Yugoslav officials, including Rumania's party leader, Nicol Ceausescu, and the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, have made visits to Peking in 1971.

This expansion of China's activities in East Europe is encouraging and laying the foundation for an informal Balkan-type alliance which the Soviets have always opposed. (As far back as 1948, Stalin vetoed a Balkan Federation.) These developments add to Soviet concern because they fuel the negative and cumulative effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the Soviet position in East Europe. By surfacing her differences with the Soviet Union and distracting the Soviet Union in the east, China has given the East European nations greater room for maneuver against total Soviet domination in the west. At the same time, many major issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute have their counterparts explicitly or implicitly in Soviet-East European relations. These issues relate to territorial claims, political independence of the Warsaw Treaty Organization members, and their possession or sharing of nuclear missile capabilities. On each of these issues, China has implicitly or explicitly tried to incite the treaty members to air their grievances against or against the independence of the Soviet Union.

Thus, with regard to the territorial is-

he Chinese have scored with the point that the Soviet Union occupies not only former Chinese lands but also territory that once belonged to the treaty members, viz., Poland's eastern lands, the Czechs' sub-Carpathia, Rumania's Bessarabia, Germany's East Prussia. As far back as 1964, Mao called attention to the plight of the treaty members by explicitly listing their claims along with China's own. While only Rumania has responded openly by surfacing the historical record of her possession of Bessarabia, other treaty members undoubtedly share Rumania's attitude about the lands lost to the Soviets.

In this context, the Chinese have stirred up one major concern of the Soviet Union that particularly affects its relations with East Europe. By referring to Germany among those wronged by the Soviet Union, China has resurrected Soviet concern over a two-front threat in the form of Sino-German collusion. This has been reflected in Soviet denunciation of West Germany and China as allies with territorial designs against the Soviet Union. And the increase in West German-Chinese economic ties (trade, steel consortium and so on) as well as reported West German-Chinese political contacts (including those by ranking members of the currently ruling Social Democratic party) have served to feed Soviet phobia. While open expressions of Soviet concern have been toned down since West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's accession to power, they have not been silenced. Moreover, even if Brandt's intentions are well meant—and this is not accepted by all Soviet leaders, particularly the military—there is a Soviet judgment that his domestic position is so precarious that hostile anti-Soviet forces (particularly in the Christian Democratic party which, as the largest party in the German Parliament, has been gaining electoral strength against Brandt) are likely to make a comeback and to act on parallel or coordinated policies with China.

<sup>2</sup> East Germany's former party boss Walter Ulbricht was bitter after the Soviets forced his removal this year; others undoubtedly share his views about the heavy Soviet hand. The Chinese capitalized on this feeling in the early 1960's and the Soviets are concerned that this could happen again.

To be sure, so far the Soviets have explicitly interpreted the alleged Sino-German collusion to apply to West Germany and China, even though in his enumeration of territorial claims against the Soviets Mao was deliberately ambiguous as to whether he was referring to West or East Germany. But if their private reaction to all Germans are any indication, the Soviets do not exclude East German hostility if the circumstances—such as the departure of Soviet divisions from East German soil—permit it.<sup>2</sup> In any case, any West and East German rapprochement would, in the face of a continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, serve to reinforce Soviet apprehension about the territorial status quo in East Europe.

Beyond the territorial question, East Europe has been affected by China's challenge of the Soviet leadership in defining the general line and strategy of the Communist movement. Peking may itself aspire to the leadership of the Communist world. Although East European parties would oppose this as well as the strategy proposed by China, they nevertheless share with China her goal of reducing the Soviet Union's ability to dominate them and to dictate their "road to socialism."

In the national security field, the Chinese have challenged the credibility of the Soviet Union's nuclear deterrent in defending the Communist world's interests since it has failed, in the Chinese view, to protect their interests. The Chinese view was asserted in the wake of an earlier reaction to the Soviet missile breakthrough in 1957, symbolized by their slogan of "the East Wind prevailing over the West." In operational terms, as far as China was concerned, this slogan implied that the Soviet nuclear-missile monopoly in the Communist world was available to advance the interests of other Communist states or to defend them against an "imperialist" attack. As far as Peking is concerned, the Soviets have failed on both counts, as reflected in their failure to back China in the 1958 offshore islands crisis.

The Chinese have raised doubts about the Soviet Union's reliability not only in their own



case (which involved primarily only the promotion of China's interests in the Taiwan Straits and not her survival), but with regard to the more important situation of North Vietnam. In the earlier years of the war, the Chinese noted for East European consumption that the United States was bombing North Vietnam at will despite earlier Soviet pledges of the inviolability of this Communist ally's territorial integrity.

By questioning Soviet reliability, the Chinese have raised doubts among the treaty members about whether the Soviet Union might not behave toward them as it has behaved toward North Vietnam, i.e., fail to use all means at its command to defend them against an external attack. In effect, China has raised the question in East Europe of whether the Soviet nuclear missile capabilities would be used for anything except the direct defense of the Soviet homeland. But even if East Europe is confident about a Soviet response to any United States or West European military action against a treaty member, China has undoubtedly created anxiety among some treaty members about Soviet reliability in situations short of conflict, i.e., whether their interests might not be sold out by some overriding Soviet expediency. For example, to forestall West Germany's resurgence or to entice her from the West, the Soviets might deal with West Germany over East Europe's head (as they have done in the past). Consequently, East Europe undoubtedly feels it should have a finger on nuclear missile capabilities in order not to leave it helpless in the face of any future Soviet-German arrangements. (In addition to demanding the rotation of the command of the Warsaw Pact Forces, now exclusively in Soviet hands, the Rumanians have reportedly raised the question of nuclear sharing, clearly without success to date.) It would be surprising indeed if the Soviets granted a nuclear role to any East European country. Yet any current or future Soviet reluctance would seem to validate Chinese arguments against relying on the Soviet nuclear deterrent and would add to the Soviet "credibility gap."

Because the East European-Soviet issues

are related to the broader context of Sino-Soviet relations and because they are subject to Chinese exploitation, much to Soviet chagrin, their resolution is dependent on more overriding issues in the Sino-Soviet dialogue. But this dispute seems further from resolution than ever.

Thus the time has long passed when the Soviets would help China increase her nuclear missile arsenal so that she could threaten the Soviets directly or advance her interests against better Soviet judgment; nor are the Soviets about to return territory to China, in part because this would encourage others to make similar claims (the 1969 clashes on the Sino-Soviet border vividly demonstrate the Soviet reaction to any Chinese border "adjustment"); nor will the Soviets freely turn over to China whatever remains of their once preeminent role in the Communist world.

This compound of negatives makes it unlikely that the Soviets will make similar far reaching concessions to East Europe. In the face of higher priorities and unfulfilled domestic needs, the Soviets will not provide economic aid or help East Europe's economy become more productive and thereby give the East European states the economic wherewithal for greater independence. Indeed Soviet action in building pipe lines and power grids from the Soviet Union to East Europe in effect keeps the latter dependent on Soviets in more subtle ways than direct control via Soviet military forces in the area. Then, too, the Soviet Union is unlikely to provide East Europe with independent nuclear capabilities because East Europe could use them to embroil the Soviets in internecine conflicts between treaty members trying to recover lands from each other (e.g., the currently inflamed Hungarian-Rumanian dispute).

*(Continued on page 243)*

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*"... a fair argument can be made (a) that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in a strategic arms limitation accord; (b) that this interest stems neither from altruism nor from any abandonment of traditional Soviet national interests but from a pragmatic belief that such an accord would advance Soviet economic and strategic objectives; and (c) that the recent Soviet ICBM buildup can be reasonably explained as a logical response to past and present United States strategic policies."*

## Moscow and the Missile Race

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IN HIS ADDRESS to the Supreme Soviet in June, 1968, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko imparted new momentum to the long-deadlocked East-West arms control dialogue when he officially announced that the Soviet Union was finally 'ready for an exchange of opinion' with the United States on the question of limiting the further deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons.<sup>1</sup> This disclosure marked a significant turning point in the traditional course of United States-Soviet strategic relations, for it suggested that Moscow had at long last come to recognize the permanence of mutual deterrence between the two superpowers and the futility of continuing the nuclear arms race.\*

In Washington, the Gromyko proposal brought forth an immediate wave of optimism. Leading newspapers heralded the move as a triumph of rationality in Soviet

affairs and a major step toward stabilizing the nuclear balance of terror. State Department spokesmen were said to be "vastly encouraged" by the Gromyko statement.<sup>2</sup> And President Lyndon Johnson, while laboring under no illusions that the talks would be easy or that tangible results would be immediately forthcoming, promptly welcomed the Soviet gesture as a significant breakthrough in the quest for an end to the arms race.

This new spirit of hope was rudely shattered scarcely two months later, however, by the abrupt and unexpected Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet move triggered an almost reflexive outpouring of moral indignation in the West, and raised new doubts about the prospects of accommodation with the Soviet Union. Although Soviet spokesmen hastened to label the intervention an internal bloc affair and privately urged that their nascent arms dialogue with the United States continue unimpaired, the incipient atmosphere of detente and cooperation which had begun to emerge after the Gromyko speech sustained a major setback. Plans for a meeting between President Johnson and Premier Aleksei Kosygin on the arms control issue were summarily cancelled by the United States as a result of the Czech crisis, and the opening of concrete negotiations at the diplo-

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<sup>1</sup> Report by Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," *Pravda*, June 28, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Grose, "U.S. Encouraged by Soviet Stand," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1968.

matic level was then postponed indefinitely.<sup>3</sup>

In the intervening years since that eventful summer of 1968, a great deal has occurred in the realm of United States-Soviet strategic relations. On the American side of the equation, the Nixon administration has systematically recast both the parameters of the East-West arms dialogue which prevailed during the Johnson incumbency and the entire thrust of United States nuclear strategy and defense policy. In particular, the administration's insistence on continuing the United States multiple warhead (MIRV) deployment program despite the Soviet Union's manifest interest in arms limitation talks has fundamentally altered the original terms on which the United States-Soviet arms control discussions were to have been based and, many would argue, has substantially diminished the prospects for any future offensive weapons limitation agreement.<sup>4</sup> On the Soviet side, the curious inconsistency between Moscow's professions of arms control interest and its continued deployment of strategic offensive missiles well beyond the static level of current United States ICBM strength has greatly galvanized United States fears of an incipient Soviet "first-strike" capability and has provoked a categorical American unwillingness to curtail projected United States weapons programs in the absence of any demonstrated Soviet disposition to do likewise. In the process, of course, after a series of frustrating setbacks and false starts, both superpowers have finally succeeded in getting

their formal strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) underway. Yet the spirit of exuberant optimism which marked the initial exchanges on the subject in July, 1968, has now clearly been replaced by a sense of mutual caution and distrust as the Soviets and Americans focus with growing apprehension on each other's expanding strategic arsenals.

Under the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the Nixon administration should feel distrustful of Soviet declarations and should suspect, as it deeply does, that Moscow may be using the arms control issue merely as a ruse to cover what many perceive to be a quest for "strategic superiority" over the United States. Nonetheless, as we shall attempt to show in the following discussion a fair argument can be made (a) that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in a strategic arms limitation accord; (b) that this interest stems neither from altruism nor from any abandonment of traditional Soviet national interests but from a pragmatic belief that such an accord would advance Soviet economic and strategic objectives; and (c) that the recent Soviet ICBM buildup can be reasonably explained as a logical response to past and present United States strategic policies. Since this last point is clearly the most vital to any balanced understanding of recent Soviet strategic behavior, we may perhaps best begin our analysis by turning to it first.

## BACKGROUND OF CURRENT ISSUES

If any single characteristic could be ascribed to American perceptions of the United States-Soviet strategic balance during the first half of the 1960's, it would almost have to be expressed as an overarching sense of sublime self-confidence. The specter of the much feared "missile gap" quietly evaporated shortly after President John F. Kennedy's assumption of office, and the subsequent expansion and diversification of the United States nuclear arsenal quickly erased any remaining doubts as to where the strategic balance lay.<sup>5</sup> The United States had achieved an overwhelming numerical preponderance over the Soviet Union in nuclear missile strength, and there seemed no

<sup>3</sup> See Benjamin Welles, "U.S. Cool to New Soviet Bid on Nuclear Talks," *The New York Times*, September 16, 1968.

<sup>4</sup> MIRV is an acronym for "multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicle," a system which has the effect of multiplying the number of warheads deliverable by a single booster to separate aiming points. The difficulty with this system is that once it is installed aboard operational ICBM's, neither side will be able to verify the numerical warhead strength of the other by any means short of actual on-site inspection arrangements. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been reluctant to submit to such arrangements.

<sup>5</sup> For detailed discussions of this strategic force expansion, see William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 47-101, and Alain G. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 165-196.

apparent Soviet interest in contesting that superiority.

Then came the Cuban crisis of October, 1962, an event which the conventional wisdom interpreted as a daring Soviet gamble to narrow the strategic asymmetry "on the cheap" by deploying medium-range ballistic missiles at the very doorstep of the United States.<sup>6</sup> The resounding failure of the Soviets to achieve this presumed objective was almost universally attributed to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's intimidation by the threat posed by our nuclear superiority; thus the Cuban missile crisis quickly entered the idiom of American strategic thinking as an epochal watershed in the evolution of the nuclear age. Students of Soviet affairs and professional strategic analysts alike widely heralded that event both as proof of our incontrovertible strategic supremacy and, more significantly, as Moscow's last gasp in the nuclear arms race.

On the first count, the dominant belief was concisely reflected in Raymond Garthoff's assertion that as a result of Khrushchev's forced removal of the missiles from Cuba, "the American strategic superiority was loudly confirmed: his ploy proved his need for such . . . missiles, and its failure not only denied them but bore impressive witness to the American superiority that compelled him to capitulate."<sup>7</sup> On the second count, numerous commentators thought that because of the Soviet Union's mounting domestic economic pressures and its presumed lack of the resources necessary to underwrite a sustained

ICBM competition, Moscow had to consign itself to a permanent state of inferiority in the superpower relationship and accept the political strictures which that inferiority imposed.

In a representative expression of this widely prevalent thesis, a noted United States expert on Soviet military affairs remarked that while "the Soviet Union would like to be the military equal or even the superior" of the United States, "the important question is not what the Soviet Union would like but what it can get." Because of the towering obstacles which supposedly lay in the path of Moscow's strategic ambitions, he went on to assert, "it seems likely that . . . the Soviet Union will continue to be second in military power to the United States."<sup>8</sup> The official euphoria which such perceptions engendered eventually found its ultimate enshrinement in Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's confident proclamation in 1965 that the Soviet leaders "have decided that they have lost the quantitative race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest. There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours."<sup>9</sup>

By the middle of 1966, there began to appear increasing signs that these sanguine conclusions regarding the "permanence" of Soviet inferiority were considerably premature. To be sure, in the aftermath of Moscow's retreat in the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev did abandon—at least for the moment—the pursuit of nuclear arms competition in favor of a policy of limited detente with the West. Yet the Leonid Brezhnev-Aleksei Kosygin coalition which overthrew him in 1964 seemed progressively to hold a different vision of the course which Soviet strategic policies should follow. The first indication of this evident departure was manifested in the Soviet Union's deployment of a prototype ABM defense around Moscow. In short order, this ABM initiative was followed by renewed signs of activity in the realm of offensive missile deployment. Whether or not these developments suggested that Moscow was now aiming—contrary to McNamara's

<sup>6</sup> The most detailed and widely-cited presentation of this interpretation is Arnold L. Horelick, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior*, *World Politics*, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (April, 1964), pp. 363-389.

<sup>7</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, "Military Power in Soviet Policy," in John Erickson, ed., *The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 255. For a critique of this viewpoint, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Deterrence in the MIRV Era," *World Politics*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (January, 1972), forthcoming.

<sup>8</sup> Herbert S. Dinerstein, *The United States and the Soviet Union: Standoff or Confrontation?* (The RAND Corporation, P-3046, January, 1965), p. 7, 10.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, *U.S. News and World Report*, April 2, 1965.



mara's earlier disclaimer—"to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours," they clearly indicated that the Soviet Union had embarked on a major campaign to improve its strategic position.

Today, largely as a result of the dramatic achievements of that Soviet campaign, the pendulum of United States defense policy has swung full cycle from its former blithe complacency to a new extreme of hyper-vigilance and almost obsessive concern. The contemporary view of the official United States defense policy community holds that the Soviet Union is steadily advancing toward clear strategic supremacy over the United States and that this presumed effort threatens soon to leave us in a "second-rate strategic position" if we fail to offset it quickly with new force deployments of our own.<sup>10</sup> Without minimizing the admitted impressiveness of current Soviet strategic power, there are good reasons for severely questioning the validity of this notion. Perhaps the best way to begin presenting them is by examining the external pressures which have largely motivated and directed the recent trends in Soviet military policy.

The overall thrust of the Soviet Union's recent force expansion cannot meaningfully

be understood apart from the larger United States-Soviet strategic relationship within which it has unfolded. Like most other large powers, the Soviet Union conceives its military needs as direct consequences of its underlying perceptions of threat and opportunity. Naturally, therefore, its leaders formulate their security policies with a careful eye on the activities and policies of their American adversary.

For years following its defeat in the Cuban missile episode of 1962, the Soviet Union was confronted with an almost relentless barrage of United States public rhetoric basking in the glow of our presumption to strategic superiority. The hubris reflected in these self-confident proclamations could hardly have set well with a Soviet leadership which has long since come to expect for itself the special prerogatives and respect due a great power. Prior to the Cuban confrontation and before the strategic balance had become fully revealed to lie in the United States favor, the Soviets could easily enough invoke Western uncertainties about Soviet strength in support of their demands for deference from Washington.<sup>11</sup> "U.S. President John Kennedy once admitted," Marshal Malinovskii could then remind the West, "that our strength is equal. This was a more or less correct acknowledgment, and it is high time that the American military leaders drew the appropriate conclusions."<sup>12</sup> When the unyielding American firmness during the 1962 missile crisis suggested a profound United States indifference to that putative Soviet equality, however, Moscow could do little more than voice melancholy wonderment at "how the admission of our equal military capabilities tallies with such unequal relations between our great states."<sup>13</sup> And once the East-West strategic asymmetry had become unmistakably apparent, the inferior Soviets had to fall back on the bare alternative of asserting plain claims to "sufficiency," claims which both they and their adversary knew to be devoid of tangible substance.<sup>14</sup>

Beyond this severely damaged national amour-propre which the Soviet Union sustained as a result of its Cuban failure and

<sup>10</sup> See William Beecher, "Laird Cites Peril if Soviet Presses Missile Buildup," *The New York Times*, February 21, 1970.

<sup>11</sup> See Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R., *Pravda*, January 25, 1962.

<sup>13</sup> N.S. Khrushchev, Letter to President Kennedy, October 28, 1962, in Henry M. Pachter, *Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 218.

<sup>14</sup> In a 1964 interview, the commander of the Soviet strategic missile forces, Marshal N. I. Krylov, advanced the "sufficiency" formulation this way: "... our forces have SUCH A QUANTITY of nuclear warheads and SUCH A QUANTITY of missiles as to permit us . . . to destroy any aggressor. . . ." "Always on the Alert," *Izvestia*, February 23, 1964 (capitals in the original). In his excellent analysis of Soviet strategic policy during the late Khrushchev era, Thomas W. Wolfe has perceptively noted how Krylov's "resort to capital letters illustrates the handicap under which Soviet marshals labor . . . when trying to hold up their end of the strategic dialogue." *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 163.



subsequent United States braggadocio about its nuclear superiority, other developments were making it increasingly imperative that Moscow take a second look at the adequacy of its strategic capabilities. For one thing, Communist China's accession to nuclear status in late 1964 added a new potential threat to Soviet interests, and this breakthrough—especially within the context of the marked erosion which had come to beset the Sino-Soviet relationship—could only increase the long-term political strains in Moscow's already creaky deterrent. For another thing, the United States had embarked on a full-scale bombing campaign against North Vietnam, thereby directly affronting the Soviet Union's avowed commitment to defend its socialist allies in Hanoi. Most irritating of all, however, in the eyes of Soviet planners the whole thrust of United States foreign and strategic policy projected an image of unsummate militancy which could not be allowed to go on unchallenged. In the face of these perceived threats—not so much to the physical security of the Soviet Union itself as to what one observer recently termed Moscow's "virile self-image"<sup>15</sup>—soothing self-assurances that all remained well quickly lost their ability to console the Soviet leadership. The military professionals began to exert sustained pressures on their party superiors to replace rhetoric with actions,<sup>16</sup> and the stage was gradually set for a sweeping departure from the preestablished mold of Soviet strategic policy.

As best as we can reconstruct events, it seems that sometime shortly after the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime consolidated its domestic political power base following its ouster of

Khrushchev, a decision was made by the Communist party to undertake an across-the-board revamping of Soviet military policy—in hardware, doctrine and objectives. In material terms, this policy shift entailed a combined program of (a) carrying through to initial operational status the ABM system which had been inaugurated during Khrushchev's tenure in office; (b) closing the gap in number of Soviet ICBM's relative to the United States; and (c) shoring up the credibility of the Soviet retaliatory capacity through missile "hardening" and dispersal measures.

Conceptually, it also included a basic change in the Soviet strategic doctrinal orientation from a relatively rigid and static "minimum deterrence" mold to a more flexible and dynamic global thrust.<sup>17</sup> Its basic inspiration seemed to be a desire to impress on the United States once and for all that Soviet power and interest were to be taken seriously.

While there is no doubt that even the "inferior" Soviet nuclear capabilities which existed throughout the first half of the past decade were more than adequate to deter a calculated United States attack, those capabilities had to remain substantially devoid of any significant psychopolitical utility as long as the United States could talk as though it believed its own superiority provided the license for an interventionist foreign policy. If, on the other hand, the Soviets could somehow move to deny Washington the convenient prop afforded by the assumption of meaningful superiority, then they could perhaps manage to acquire a more comfortable basis on which to demand a measure of equity from the West. Accordingly, it seems most likely that the principal purposes of the Soviet Union's post-Khrushchev strategic arms buildup were (a) to erase the embarrassing image of "inferiority" which had been conferred on it by American strategic oratory and by the inescapable reality of the nuclear balance, and (b) to acquire the necessary additional military capabilities to present itself as an undeniable equal to the United States in all significant aspects of combat

<sup>15</sup> Ralph K. White, *Nobody Wanted War: Misreception in Vietnam and Other Wars* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), p. 335.

<sup>16</sup> A detailed case study of this military campaign may be found in Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Politics of the Soviet Military Under Brezhnev and Kosygin* (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, June, 1968). See also Roman Kolwicz, *The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition* (Institute for Defense Analyses, P-383, October, 1967).

<sup>17</sup> For a knowledgeable and comprehensive account of this policy shift, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 427-458.

power. At the present time, it appears that the Soviet leadership has met with considerable success on both counts.<sup>18</sup>

Yet having attained "equality" with the United States, the Soviet Union continues to upgrade its strategic capabilities. Both its MIRV development program and its missile deployment rate seem to be going ahead without significant interruption.<sup>19</sup> Does it follow then from this that Moscow seeks even more ambitious strategic goals, above and beyond nuclear parity? Many authoritative observers in this country have suggested that it indeed does. There is a fair presumptive argument to be made to the contrary, however, and to do so we must consider the Soviet Union's attitudes toward the role of the SALT talks in its current national security scheme.

### SALT IN SOVIET POLICY

Appeals for "disarmament" have, of course, been a standard refrain in the litany of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy ever since the earliest years of the Soviet state. Yet despite this persistent verbal advocacy, throughout most of their history the Soviets have rarely been disposed to consider measures which would actually require them to limit or reduce the size of their arsenal. Soviet disarmament policy traditionally has been merely part and parcel of a larger political-propaganda effort to bolster the "peace-loving" image of the Soviet Union and to undermine the military challenge posed by its American adversary. Moscow's repeated calls for "general and complete disarmament," for example, safely voiced with the prior knowledge

that they would be categorically rejected by the United States, have long sought to embarrass the West by enabling the Soviets to pose a contrast between the avowed "reasonableness" of the socialist camp and what the Soviets have maintained to be the militaristic character of United States imperialism. Similarly, when they have been offered, such Soviet gestures as proposals for abolishing nuclear weapons, withdrawing troops from Europe, dismantling military bases on foreign soil, halting nuclear-armed manned bomber patrols and the like have all been directed toward the largely self-serving goal of eliminating certain perceived external threats to Soviet policy and security interests. They have shared the common feature of demanding, in effect, unilateral concessions from the United States with little or no significant Soviet reciprocity.<sup>20</sup>

Throughout the SALT negotiations, however, the Soviets have espoused interest in arms control measures which, if implemented, would require tangible concessions on the own part as well as concessions from the American adversary. Moreover, this interest has been articulated in a declaratory tone suggesting unprecedented seriousness of purpose on the part of those Soviet leaders responsible for it. Finally, both the businesslike negotiating approach displayed by the Soviet SALT delegation and the extreme caution that delegation has taken to avoid the sort of propagandistic harangues characteristic of most previous Soviet disarmament rhetoric have seemed directly intended to underscore Moscow's profession that it is honestly seeking a nuclear *modus vivendi* with the United States.

That this unprecedented Soviet arms control seriousness should have emerged precisely when the Soviet Union has reached a position of approximate military-strategic parity with the United States would seem even to the most casual observer to be anything but coincidence. Indeed, it is more probable that Moscow's achievement of this position has sufficiently satisfied the Soviet leaders so that they have a new perspective on the potential opportunities to be exploit

<sup>18</sup> For a detailed comparative breakdown of United States and Soviet military forces, see *The Military Balance, 1971-1972* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).

<sup>19</sup> Deployment of the large and worrisome Soviet SS-9 booster, however, seems to have stabilized at around the 300 mark, far below the level needed to provide anything approaching an effective first-strike capability against U.S. land-based ICBM's. See William Beecher, "Data Indicate Moscow is Slowing ICBM Deployment," *The New York Times*, December 17, 1970.

<sup>20</sup> For an excellent survey of these Soviet disarmament proposals, see Malcolm Mackintosh and Harry T. Willetts, "Arms Control and the Soviet National Interest," in Louis Henkin, ed., *Arms Control: Issues for the Public* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 141-173.

through arms control negotiations. A long standing assumption of Western analyses of Soviet disarmament policy has been that the Soviet Union would oppose entertaining proposals for arms "freezes" under conditions of manifest inferiority to the United States, since to do otherwise would be tantamount to conceding Soviet weakness before the enemy.<sup>21</sup> Having finally attained nuclear parity with the United States, however, Moscow no longer remains constrained by this consideration and can now afford to contemplate the likely utility of some arms limitation accord which (a) stabilizes United States and Soviet strategic capabilities more or less at their present levels; (b) formally ratifies Soviet equality to the United States and, more important, explicit American acknowledgment of that equality before the rest of the world; (c) adequately provides for the continued security needs of the Soviet state; and (d) reduces the likelihood of a costly new round of arms competition with the West whose ultimate outcome might simply be to leave the Soviets worse off in the strategic balance than they ever were before.

A *Pravda* correspondent writing shortly after Foreign Minister Gromyko's 1968 Supreme Soviet speech all but directly admitted that such reasoning underlies Moscow's SALT policy when he approvingly quoted a *Washington Post* editorial to the effect that

it is possible to maintain that one of those rare moments of history has come when both sides are ready to admit equality in the broadest sense and to view this as an initial position for reaching agreement concerning the freezing and subsequent reduction of arms. . . . It is the politicians' task not to let this chance slip away.<sup>22</sup>

## THE BALANCE SHEET

In the overview, the mere fact that the Soviet Union is engaging in SALT—something it would never have done prior to hav-

ing achieved its hard-won nuclear equality to the United States—seems in itself to be evidence that the Kremlin sees more than simple propaganda benefits to be gained from an East-West arms control dialogue. The Soviet leaders (at least for the moment) appear reasonably persuaded that mutual deterrence is here to stay and that the returns to be reaped from a stabilized nuclear balance promise to outweigh any advantages that might accrue from an unrestricted continuation of the arms race. To say that their interest in SALT is self-serving is hardly to deny that it remains genuine. They are well aware that strategic arms production is an expensive proposition and, like decision-makers everywhere, they face constantly competing internal claims on the allocation of their scarce economic resources.

Among other things, a SALT agreement—whether comprehensive or merely limited—would release substantial amounts of those resources from military procurement programs which could then possibly be channeled toward important domestic needs. Moreover, and perhaps even more important, the Soviet leadership might well find that a "super-stable" nuclear equilibrium growing out of SALT would open up new foreign policy prospects at lower conflict thresholds which formerly were, and to a degree still remain, foreclosed by the threat of nuclear escalation.

There is a strong probability that the bitter  
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<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Alexander Dallin *et al.*, *The Soviet Union, Arms Control, and Disarmament* (Columbia University: School of International Affairs, 1964), p. 162.

<sup>22</sup> G. Ratiani, "The Half-Year Mark," *Pravda*, July 7, 1968. For a more recent example, see also Bernard Gwertzman "Brezhnev Bids U.S. Accept principle of Parity in Arms," *The New York Times*, June 12, 1971.

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*"In brief, the Twenty-Fourth Congress reflected the caution and conservatism of the present leadership; a measure of confidence about the economic problems at home; serious apprehension about dilemmas in world communism, and considerable hope that, as in the recent past, the errors and disarray of the capitalist world would provide the best propaganda for communism at home and abroad."*

## The Twenty-Fourth Soviet Party Congress

BY ADAM ULAM

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THE 24TH CONGRESS of the Soviet Communist party in 1971 predictably contained no surprises or revelations.\* Ever since they took over from Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 the present rulers of the Soviet Union have tried to avoid any revelations or pyrotechnics in the style of their predecessor; they have also tended to sweep troublesome problems under the rug insofar as possible and if impossible to deal with them *sotto voce*, thus giving their own people and foreign observers no incentive to realize how serious some of them are and how they threaten the whole rationale of the Soviet system, if not the existence of the regime.

Khrushchev's intermittent denunciations of Stalin, his acknowledgment of the seriousness of the Chinese problem, and his alternation of the most dire threats against the West with proposals of a virtual alliance with the United States (sometimes in the same speech)—all those pyrotechnics contributed to his losing favor with his colleagues and to his downfall. Brezhnev, Kosygin and Company have been determined not to repeat the same error, not to alarm or excite their own people unduly, not to give Washington and

Peking an insight into their fears or dissensions. The Congress' intended effect was to suggest monolithic unity of the party, the harmony of national and social relations in the U.S.S.R., and the confidence of the rulers that all is well with world communism and that, while the imperialist camp headed by the United States is to be watched, the forces of history are clearly on the side of communism and the U.S.S.R.

The 24th Congress was thus intentionally even duller than the 23rd had been in 1961. Then there was still some agitation over the backwash of the dismissal of Khrushchev and serious and voiced anxieties over United States policies in Vietnam and the sharp attacks on China. At the 24th Congress, on all those thorny subjects as well as on domestic ones, instructions to the speakers were obvious: don't rock the boat, stress the hopeful, positive aspect of things.

Still, by noting certain emphases and reacting between the lines one may arrive at a realistic appraisal of the Soviet leaders' real hopes and fears.

On foreign policy, one perceives certain progress in Soviet self-confidence insofar as the relations with and the condition of the capitalist camp are concerned. In 1966, there was still considerable nervousness about wh-

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he United States might do in Vietnam and what the U.S.S.R. might be called upon to do to avoid an American victory there. Certain foreign delegations, notably the North Vietnamese and the Cubans, implied then very strongly that the U.S.S.R. was not doing enough to help Hanoi and the Vietcong. In 1971, the Soviets viewed both the progress of the war and its effects on American society with cautious satisfaction. There was obviously a strong hint to all speakers not to gloat excessively over internal problems in the United States and the increasing American difficulty in formulating a purposeful foreign policy in the midst of the rising tide of dissent and neo-isolationism. Still those internal troubles are a source of great satisfaction to Moscow. They are the basis of cautious optimism that, in the worldwide rivalry with the United States, the U.S.S.R. has gained during the last five years and that the trend will continue. There is less reluctance to proclaim that Soviet help has been of decisive value in helping Hanoi and the Vietcong to hold out and that they are bound to prevail.

What main points do the Soviets hope to score against the faltering—as they see them—American policies? First, they hope to loosen, if not altogether to eliminate, the United States influence in Europe. Step by step, the West Europeans will grow fearful that the Americans will pull out and that they will seek a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. Here the recent initiatives of the West German government were held to be a good augury. The Soviets call for a European security conference and hope to work toward a weakening and eventual demise of NATO. The hope or, from the Soviet point of view, fear of a real union of West Europe has diminished considerably since 1966. Moscow now seeks different approaches to different Western states in order to loosen their ties to the United States. Great Britain is considered by them definitely on the downgrade economically and the British are regarded as disinclined to play any major part in international relations.

The Franco-Soviet rapprochement initiated

by de Gaulle is viewed hopefully. Beyond the virtual neutralization of West Europe (admittedly not tomorrow or the day after tomorrow) the Soviets see profitable economic ties with it. President Aleksei Kosygin drew a vista of vast projects of collaboration: a united electric grid, collaboration in transportation networks, and so forth. West Europe hopefully would become an economic ally of the U.S.S.R. and would provide help to enable the Soviet Union to improve its somewhat unsatisfactory current rate of economic growth.

In the early 1970's, the Soviets hope to work towards these goals cautiously and patiently, avoiding a major confrontation. There was still a hint in the 24th Congress that if the situation should become unexpectedly propitious for such a move, Berlin might be used again as the means of pressure on West Germany and the West in general.

Another area where the Soviets view their prospects with unconcealed satisfaction is Latin America. Five years ago there was a considerable division in Communist ranks over the tactics to be pursued there. The Soviets viewed with dissatisfaction Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's attempts to dominate revolutionary movements in other Latin countries and with alarm Chinese efforts to horn in and turn local Communist parties against Moscow. Since then, there has evidently been some sort of agreement among various Communist groups to work together, or at least not to get in each other's way while fighting for power. The Chilean model is held by the Soviets to be of great promise for many other countries: coalitions with other left and anti-American forces are to work patiently and, up to a point, through legal means to achieve power. (Some qualifications and doubts on this score will be mentioned below.) Bolivia and Peru were also mentioned favorably at the congress as being within "the wave of the future"—i.e., of emancipation from the United States and as taking first steps toward a Communist-dominated Popular Front type of regime.

The area of confrontation with the United States over which the Soviets are more appre-



hensive is of course the Middle East. Here they would like to avoid another Israeli-Arab war, to give their Arab friends proof that they can help them (return at least some territories wrested away by Israel in 1967) and at the same time to keep a degree of tension so that the Arab regimes will continue their dependence on Moscow. They are nervous about all sorts of possibilities and their own overcommitment, but give no evidence of being alarmed or fearful of losing control over the situation.

Insofar as direct relations with the United States are concerned, the Soviets seek a modest *détente*. They no longer envisage a virtual division of the world between the two such as Nikita Khrushchev evidently contemplated at times between 1957 and 1962 and of which he was plainly accused by Peking. The Soviets are aware of the still tremendous power of the United States; hence they do not wish to push too rudely. But they feel that this power has been so unintelligently managed that, barring a catastrophe or a drastic change in the situation in the United States or in their own relations with China, they should not be afraid of nudging us all over the world. They want some limitations on nuclear arms and are hopeful of establishing nuclear parity with the United States soon. Such parity, they feel, would be of psychological advantage to them since they enjoy much greater maneuverability in foreign policy than does the United States. They do not appear hopeful of really decisive steps in nuclear disarmament in the immediate future, and Brezhnev's proposal for a conference of all nuclear powers is clearly a propaganda gambit (which does not mean necessarily that it should not be picked up).

In brief, like cautious *rentiers*, the Soviets propose to act prudently and clip coupons, so to speak, gathering the rewards of their improving position in the world. What do they get out of it? Well, this satisfactory world picture is a great selling point of the Soviet system primarily to their own people, and it obscures serious and mounting internal problems both within the U.S.S.R. and in the Communist bloc. Although the So-

viet citizen's daily life does not improve as rapidly as he would like, although the new generation which does not remember Stalin is beginning to chafe under a repressive bureaucratic and oligarchical government, the argument can always be made that Soviet communism is slowly but surely winning the worldwide competition, that the vaunted freedoms and affluence of the United States have brought American society to the brink of anarchy, that for all their grievances the Soviet people should be grateful that they live in a state whose voice must be heard on every world problem and where there is law and order. This reassures the citizen also about his fear of Communist China, and makes him less prone to wonder whether the spread of communism is of any advantage to him or to the Soviet Union.

### THE PROBLEM OF CHINA

The situation within the Communist camp is the main cause of worry to the ruling hierarchy. The biggest and ineluctable problem is, of course, China. For reasons just stated, the Soviets put a relatively cheerful appearance on the present state of the dispute. There has been some amelioration of tensions since 1969, when fighting erupted on the Sino-Soviet frontier. But the huge and overwhelming problem remains. The Chinese continue to demand that the Soviets in effect subjugate their foreign policy to them that they engage in confrontations with the United States. They have announced publicly their claim to vast areas of Soviet Asia they still seek to control various foreign Communist parties. At the same time, the specter of United States-Chinese rapprochement haunts the Kremlin just as a Soviet-United States rapprochement remains the number one fear of Peking.

On this front, to be sure, the Soviets have scored some modest successes: many Communist parties sympathetic to Peking in 1966 have been brought back within the Soviet sphere, largely due to the antics of the Cultural Revolution. For the moment, the Soviets hope to paper over the difficulties. But they will not give in to the main Chinese

demands. "We shall not sacrifice *national* interests of the Soviet state," Brezhnev said, in an unmistakable reference which brought loud cheers from the 24th Congress. And the delegate from the Soviet Far Eastern province broke through official restraint when he exclaimed: "all those who want to seize Soviet land from wherever they may come will be dealt a crushing blow."

But to admit the full seriousness of the Chinese problem and the grim prospects for the future when an industrialized China will have a full nuclear arsenal is a virtual impossibility for the present rulers. What good is communism, the average Soviet citizen might ask, if the greatest potential threat to the Soviet state comes not from the capitalists, Zionists or imperialists, but from another Communist state and largely because it is Communist?

The present leaders appear for the moment to be resigned to wait for some internal developments in China which might relieve if not basically "solve" the situation. Such might be Mao's death and a new leadership which would be more friendly. Very likely, in secret the Soviets hope for a prolonged period of internal turmoil, perhaps a civil war, which might enable the U.S.S.R. to throw its influence into the balance. It is not out of the question that the relations between the U.S.S.R. and China might again take a drastic turn for the worse, although both sides are mindful of the fearful risks of a full-scale war. One has to keep in mind such developments as a possible conflict between India (which is clearly favored by Russia as a counterweight to China in Asia) and the virtual Chinese protégé, Pakistan.

But apart from China, the international situation of communism is also full of growing dilemmas for the Kremlin. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 looks from the current (Soviet) perspective like a qualified success, and it was implicitly asserted at the congress that a similar situation in a satellite would bring a similar response. But would the Soviets intervene if they knew what it would mean (as it did not in 1968) the necessity of overcoming armed resistance?

What if the situation of 1968 recurred but in more than one Communist state at the same time? There were indications at the congress that the lesson of 1968 is wearing off insofar as some East European states are concerned.

Rumania's President Nicolae Ceausescu was emphatic in stressing his country's resolve to conduct a fairly independent and sovereign foreign policy. "Our party is against any interference into internal affairs of other parties." Each party, each Communist country, has the right to work out its own destiny. And the task of running a Communist empire is beginning to be costly to the Soviets rather than being (as it was under Stalin) a source of profit. The U.S.S.R. recently had to provide considerable economic help to Poland to tide the Polish Communists over in their very serious difficulties. Situations like those in Poland in December, 1970, are likely to recur.

## THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT

In the non-Communist world, individual parties are also asserting more independence vis-à-vis Moscow. The representative of the Italian Communists was emphatic that his party views several international problems differently from the Soviet comrades. The Soviets may try to bolster the faltering international unity of the Communist movement through some new props, such as a formal organization somewhat on the model of the old Comintern. But the old monolithic pattern cannot be restored. Even when it comes to such ostensible successes as Latin America prospects still remain somewhat troublesome. There was some indication that a coalition of left parties such as is currently in power in Chile might not necessarily be stable. The Congress listened to representatives of both the Communist and the Socialist parties of Chile. The latter was unique among foreign speakers in *not* condemning American policies in Vietnam and in general sounded very different from his Communist colleague. The Chile model thus holds dangers as well as opportunities from the Soviet point of view. And while the Soviets now are fairly con-

fidet of exploiting left-wing Communist and semi-anarchist movements throughout the world and using them to their own purpose, clashes and dissonances still persist. The Brazilian party's spokesman complained of the "splitting" and "adventurist" tactics of some left-wing groups in his country. And at least in public the Soviets have condemned the recent uprising in Ceylon and probably see it as inspired by pro-Chinese elements. Any satisfaction over the predicaments of the United States is thus tempered by a realization of the troublesome problems and possibilities within the world Communist movement.

On the domestic front, the regime faces a variety of challenges. The recent rate of economic growth, although creditable (probably on the order of 4-5 per cent), has been considerably lower than it was in the 1950's. One no longer hears confident claims of catching up with and overcoming the United States when it comes to various categories of consumers' goods. The projections of economic growth to 1975 are on a fairly modest but realistic scale. The production of steel is to rise from 116 million tons for 1971 to over 142 million tons. It is proposed to increase the annual production of automobiles from about 340,000 currently to over one million. The regime promises; but one ought to keep in mind that such promises were made before, that the emphasis in the current five year plan will now shift to consumers' goods.

There is evidently some hope that the corner has been turned on the Soviet economy's most troublesome sector, i.e., agriculture. The policy of increased material incentives to the peasants is to be continued and strengthened. In 1975, the average remuneration of the collective farm's peasant is to be about two-thirds that of the industrial worker, and presumably his earnings from his private plot should bring him up to parity with the city dweller.

The need for a greater stress on consumers' goods, for an improvement in their quality, was heard in practically every dignitary's speech. With all the qualifications mentioned above, and keeping in mind official

warnings that a change in the international situation may affect the picture, the fact remains that the leadership is committed more than ever before to improving the standard of living and the quality of goods and services. On paper at least, and for the first time, the annual increase in the output of consumer goods is to outstrip that of producer goods. Special family allowances are to be introduced for low income families. Collective farm families are to be encouraged to expand their private plots slightly and to build private family houses, something which was often discouraged or prohibited in the past.

What if the regime cannot deliver on its pledges? Or what if a series of bad harvests again play havoc with Soviet agriculture as they did in the early 1960's? The recent example of Poland suggests that such a situation might trigger an internal crisis and lead to a change in the highest leadership. The U.S.S.R., needless to say, is not Poland; its rulers are much more firmly seated in the saddle; the machinery of repression is much stronger and would probably not allow an eruption of workers' revolts such as occurred in Poland in December, 1970. But in their cautious frame of mind, the Soviet leader most likely consider the Polish events a warning.

With regard to the social problems bedeviling the country, the delegates again observed restraint and discretion. Little mention was made, as compared with 1966, of trouble with dissent in literature and the arts. Practically no reference was made to the Jewish problem at home. The nationality problem, potentially the most dangerous, was mentioned only obliquely through references to the "unbreakable union" of the nations and  
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"Assuming no sudden, sizable defense expenditures and the ability of the consumer lobby to keep the "metal eaters" in check, a modest but real improvement in the Soviet people's material wellbeing may be expected in the course of the next five years."

## Soviet Man in the Ninth Plan

BY JAN S. PRYBYLA

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THOSE ASPECTS OF THE LATEST Soviet long-term plan which are likely to affect the Soviet citizens' standard of living in the years to come are of considerable interest. The Ninth Plan was made public on February 4, 1971, in the form of draft directives, 30 months after these were scheduled to appear, and was approved by the party's 24th Congress (itself a year overdue) in March-April, 1971. The plan covers the years 1971-1975.

"The main task of the Five-Year Plan," say the directives, "is to ensure a considerable upswing in the material and cultural standards of the people. . . ."<sup>1</sup> This has been the main task of all previous long-term plans, but it has not always materialized.

In order to make headway in the stated direction, a number of steps will have to be taken in defiance of powerful lobbies and entrenched habits.

First and most important, the economy will

have to produce more and better consumer goods and services, and to distribute them more efficiently and equitably than it has done, so that personal consumption levels can be raised. At the same time, it may be thought desirable to improve communal consumption (for example, the availability and quality of medical care, schooling and so on).

Second, the rate of growth of consumer goods output has to be stepped up relative to the rate of growth of producers' goods output. At its peak (1960) the share of consumer goods in total industrial output was only 27.5 per cent.

Third, the money incomes of citizens must be raised; the gap between urban and rural incomes must be narrowed; and the prices of consumer goods and services must remain relatively stable. The first and third steps complement each other: an increase in money incomes will not mean much if either the prices of consumer goods rise significantly, or if prices are kept stable but the goods are not there in quantities and qualities needed to satisfy the demand for them. (This has been the normal situation in the Soviet Union for years. In all but Marxist-Leninist societies it goes by the name of suppressed inflation.)

Finally, given the tight overall labor supply situation in the country (a fact which does not rule out pockets of frictional, seasonal, regional and technological unemployment), the success of the drive to raise living standards will hinge on significant increases in

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<sup>1</sup> *Directives of the 24th Congress of the CPSU for the Five-Year Economic Development Plan of the USSR for 1971-1975* (henceforth referred to as *Directives*), in: *Reprints from the Soviet Press (RSP)*, Vol. XII, Nos., 6-7, (April 2, 1971), p. 10. The other key documents are: *Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union delivered by Leonid Brezhnev (March 30, 1971)*, in: *RSP* Vol. XII, Nos., 9-10 (May 14, 1971), and *Directives of the 24th Congress of the CPSU for the Five-Year Economic Development Plan of the USSR for 1971-1975: A Report by Alexei Kosygin (April 6, 1971)*, in: *RSP*, Vol. XII, Nos., 11-12 (June 11, 1971). (Henceforth referred to as *Brezhnev Report* and *Kosygin Report* respectively.)

labor productivity. This, in turn, brings up the question of methods of economic management which, however, cannot be discussed within the limits of this article.

### CONSUMER GOODS SUPPLY

In terms of quantity, the plan proposes to increase the output of clothing, footwear and other consumer goods (light industry products) by 35 to 40 per cent. Production of food, meat, milk, and fish is to rise by 33 to 35 per cent. The output of articles of everyday use and household appliances (consumer durables) will rise by 80 per cent. Commodity sales are to climb by 42 per cent, and the volume of paid services by 47 per cent.

These percentages boggle the mind, but the following comments may be of help. Take textiles as an example. The target for 1975 is 10.5 to 11.0 billion square meters. This compares with former Premier Nikita Khrushchev's target for 1970 of 13.6 billion square meters, and his projection for 1980 (presumed entry into full communism) of 20 to 22 billion square meters. In other words, the target set for the Eighth Plan (1966-1970) will not be reached in 1975 (the end of the Ninth Plan), by which time the population will have been larger by several millions. Or consider consumer services: their volume is to be doubled by 1975 (and trebled in the countryside).

However, the base from which the jump is

<sup>2</sup> Keith Bush, "Consumption in 1971-75," *Radio Liberty Dispatch (RLD)*, (February 19, 1971), derived from *Planozoye khozyaistvo*, No. 4 (1970), p. 67, and *Narkhoz* (the Soviet statistical yearbook) for 1967, p. 11. At the end of 1970, for every 1,000 Soviet families, 70 had a radio-phonograph or radio, 50 had a television set, and 52 a washing machine and a sewing machine. One out of two urban families owned a refrigerator. *Pravda* (June 6, 1971), p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Pravda* (May 6, 1971), p. 3. In Leningrad in 1970, almost 2 million rubles' worth of school uniforms produced in the city went unsold. The local clothing mills' association suggested that in 1971 the production of the unwanted school uniforms be cut by 100,000 units. However, this suggestion was "not backed" by the Russian Republic Ministry of Light Industry, and so in 1971 there was no cut in production. *Pravda* (May 21, 1971), p. 2. At the official exchange rate 1 ruble = \$1.10. Given the comparatively high Soviet state retail prices for many consumer items, this exchange rate does not enable anyone to make sense of the purchasing powers of the two currencies in a comparative sense. The black market rate for the dollar is said to be 2-4 rubles.

to be made is very modest. In 1970, the per capita value of consumer services in the U.S.S.R. was about 17 rubles, equivalent to eight shampoos and sets. In the countryside it was 1.70 rubles, enough for four haircuts.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, there are many years to go before the end of the plan is reached. In the past, revisions of plan targets have frequently been made in response to changing conditions (e.g., national emergencies). These factors must be kept in mind when evaluating the proposed increases in the supply of consumer goods and services. But one should not, because of that, dismiss the plan as a fraud. The projected increases appear to be more realistic than they were in the past, especially under the volatile Khrushchev. Taking the plan as a whole, the projected rates of growth of most indices are below those actually attained during the preceeding (Eighth) plan. At the end of the Ninth Plan (barring sudden rises in defense outlays) the Soviet consumer will be better off than he has ever been before; but he will still have a long way to go before he reaches personal consumption levels comparable to those now in existence in a number of East European countries, while West European consumption standards will remain out of reach.

All this, of course, says nothing about the quality of consumer goods and services or about their distribution. Quality, assortment and distribution problems have dogged the Soviet economy for decades and, given the renewed bureaucratic zeal with which they are being tackled, no real improvement may be expected in the next five years. For example, instead of handling consumer demand studies in ways suggested by the aborted reform of 1966-1968, the leaders in Moscow have set up an All-Union Research Institute for the Study of the Population's Demand for Consumer Goods and the Conditions of Trade, without any executive powers. The Institute has so far completed over 200 research projects but, as they say in informed circles, "industry does not react."<sup>3</sup> The researchers found, for example, that "the assortment of washing machines is clearly out of step with demand"; yet inventories of unsold washing machines continue to pile up. The



reasons for the unsatisfactory quality of consumer goods and services in the Soviet Union are too complex to discuss fairly in the limited space here, but in a general way they are traceable to problems inherent in the Soviet administrative system of central planning and to incentive problems at the enterprise level.

One is tempted to speculate on the comparative rates of growth in consumer goods output and in consumer expectations. It is reasonable to suppose that beyond a certain point there comes into being an accelerator effect on consumer expectations, and that this effect works not just in the direction of quantity, but on the need for better quality, ready availability and assortment. The expectations accelerator has also a political dimension: frustrated, it explodes in, say, Gdansk riots, Prague reforms, or Novocherkassk strikes. In Russia, the brake on the rate at which consumer expectations rise is made up of two parts citizen patience (acquired over the centuries) and one part state censorship on the demonstration effect filtering in from abroad. Nowadays both are showing signs of wear. Assuming these speculations to be substantially correct, the planners will have to jog much harder just to stand still in the estimation of Soviet consumers.

The Ninth Plan proposes to extend and improve a number of communally consumed services, especially to complete the introduction of universal secondary education, to train about nine million specialists, including experts in the fields of science and technology, to give attention to vocational and technical training, to modernize curricula, to bring closer the standards of rural medical services to those in the towns, and to bring the number of hospital beds up to 3 million units.

Much excitement has been caused among Western commentators by the announcement that in the course of the plan the output of consumer goods is to grow faster than the output of producer goods. Together with the continuing stress on agriculture, this repre-

sents an important departure from Stalinist and post-Stalin priorities; in fact, this is the first such departure since the beginning of forced industrialization in the late 1920's. From 1971 through 1975, the gross output of industries A (broadly producer goods) is to grow by 41–45 per cent (it rose by 50 per cent during the previous five-year period), while the output of industries B (broadly consumer goods) is to grow by 44–48 per cent (it rose by 49 per cent during 1966–1970). This apparent change in the structure of Soviet industrial production is interesting, but hardly enough to cause such a stir in the West.

First, the growth rates projected for group B industries are only slightly higher than those planned for group A. In fact, should B group's output actually grow at the lower projected rate (44 per cent) while A group's output actually increases at the higher rate projected for it (45 per cent), nothing will have happened to change the old structure of production. Second, group B in 1970 contributed only 26.2 per cent of total industrial output, so that even with the maximum projected rate of output of group B, at the end of the plan producer goods will still vastly exceed consumer goods in the total volume of industrial output (73.3 per cent, compared with 73.8 per cent in 1970—a structural change of 0.5 per cent in five years).

Third, there is much talk about the contribution to consumer goods production presently being made and to be made in the future by heavy industry. In fact, the discrepancy between the projected increase of 44–48 per cent for B group's output and the lower rates of increase scheduled for the light and food industries must in part be explained by the expected stepped-up contribution of heavy industry to the consumer durables (television sets, refrigerators, automobiles, washing machines and so on). During the plan, heavy industrial capacity devoted to the manufacture of consumer durables is to rise by 50 per cent. (It was 11.5 per cent of total heavy industry capacity in 1968; 40 per cent in the United States).<sup>4</sup> Fourth, the plan is reticent about the precise distribution of investment resources among industries. What

<sup>4</sup> Keith Bush, *RLD* (April 8, 1971). Brezhnev *Report* informs us that today "as much as 42 per cent of [the output of the defense industry] is used for civilian purposes." (p. 54.) This includes pots and pans. *Izvestia* (May 22, 1971), p. 1.

is known is that light industry is scheduled to receive 8.7 billion rubles, or nearly twice as much as in the Eighth Plan, and that almost 14 billion rubles are to be allotted to the food, meat, dairy and fishing industries. These are generous increases. However, as Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev reminded his listeners at the 24th Congress:

this [change in relative growth rates] does not invalidate our general policy oriented on the accelerated development of the production of means of production. . . .<sup>5</sup>

Average earnings of workers and employees in the public (state) sector are scheduled to rise by between 20 and 22 per cent during the plan period (as compared with a 26 per cent rise during 1966–1970 and a 20 per cent rise during 1961–1965). Average earnings of collective farmers are to be increased by 30–35 per cent (compared with a 42 per cent increase during 1966–1970). Together with cash payments out of social consumption funds (social security, welfare benefits) the population's cash incomes are expected to increase by 40 per cent in the course of the plan. Per capita real incomes in the economy as a whole are scheduled to rise by about 30 per cent (compared with 32 per cent in 1966–1970, and 20 per cent in 1961–1965). More significantly, these measures will narrow the gap between urban and rural (especially collective farm) living standards. The true effect will, however, depend on the degree to which the consumer goods industries fulfill the quantitative and qualitative targets assigned to them, and on the ability of the trade network to distribute the goods. These are big problems in the Soviet system. In addition, state retail prices will have to be kept relatively stable. (The plan proposes to ensure the stability of state retail prices for consumer goods and effect price reductions for some types of products as stocks accumulate.)<sup>6</sup> But, as we have seen, to keep state retail prices frozen is in itself not enough: the

goods have to be there in the right quantities, qualities and assortments.

One provision of the plan deserves special mention in connection with the proposed increases in incomes. During Stalin's rule, forced savings were regularly extracted from the citizens by means of compulsory state bond issues. By 1957, the national debt under this heading was 26 billion rubles. In 1952, compulsory bond purchases represented 5.4 per cent of the average wages and salaries in the non-agricultural social sector. In 1958, the practice of bonding people without their consent was stopped. The government promised that this way of mopping up inflation would not be resumed in the future. The bond holders were also informed that as of 1958 no further interest would be paid on the outstanding bonds, and that the principal would be repaid between 1977 and 1997. The plan, in the best style of chancellors of the exchequer at election time, brings forward the initial repayment date to 1974. However, the interest forfeiture clause still stands, if only by implication.

### LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

The impression one gains from reading the plan is that its fulfillment is made contingent on sharp increases in the productivity of labor. Thus, the emphasis is on intensive rather than extensive methods of production; the application of technical and managerial science to the productive process is to bring about this effect. In 1971 alone, growth in labor productivity is expected to account for 87 per cent of the increase in industrial output (91 per cent of the increase in construction work, and 100 per cent of the projected increase in railway freight shipments).<sup>7</sup> In 1971, too, the scheduled rise in agricultural output is to be achieved with a concurrent decrease of about one quarter of a million people employed in agriculture.

The emphasis on labor productivity gains is understandable in view of the increasingly tight labor supply situation in the Soviet Union. In part, the labor shortage is demographic. Since 1961, the U.S.S.R. has experienced a continual decline in the absolute

<sup>5</sup> Brezhnev *Report*, p. 53.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 61–62.

<sup>7</sup> Labor productivity in industry during the plan is to rise by 36–40 per cent, with 87–90 per cent of the total increment of production obtained from this source. *Directives*, p. 17.

number of births. In 1969, live births were only 77 per cent of the 1960 figure.<sup>8</sup> In part the labor supply problem is institutional. Many subsidiary operations in industry—even more so in collective agriculture—are still highly labor-intensive. The agricultural sector employs about one-third of the total Soviet work force; it is among the most highly subsidized in the world; and with all that, it produces relatively poor quality products at high prices. The existing planning and managerial systems in industry encourage the hoarding by managers of unreported labor resources as a precaution against sudden and unpredictable changes in targets and input supplies. Everybody knows about it, and there is much talk about “releasing hidden reserves.” But the reserves remain hidden and the one reform (1966–1968) which conceivably could have released them is for the present in limbo.

### WELFARE MEASURES

Visual impressions gained by the more enterprising Western travelers in the Soviet Union are obliquely confirmed by the welfare provisions of the Ninth Plan. The U.S.S.R. has a poverty problem, only it is not called that in the literature. The term is “underprovisioning” (*malooobespechennost*), and the plan proposes to eliminate the reality behind the euphemism. Most of the measures are designed to alleviate the problem among the lower-paid workers and office employees in the public (state) sector of the economy and among public sector retirees. The attack is to be three-pronged: an increase in the legal minimum wage, a reduction in unskilled manual labor through extensive mechanization and automation (which implies equipping with higher skills those whose jobs disappear), and the introduction of an improvement in welfare benefits.

<sup>8</sup> V. Guseinov and V. Korchagin, “Questions of Labor Resources,” *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2 (February, 1971), pp. 45–51.

<sup>9</sup> There have been three increases in the minimum public sector wage since 1957. Khrushchev had promised to introduce a minimum wage of 50–50 rubles per month by 1965.

<sup>10</sup> See Keith Bush, *RLD*, June 25, 1970, and March 30, 1971.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, (June 25, 1970).

<sup>12</sup> Kosygin Report, pp. 65–66.

Since January 1, 1968, the minimum wage paid to workers and office employees in the public sector has been 60 rubles per month.<sup>9</sup> The Soviets have never said outright how many people were earning that (or less) before 1968, but indirect evidence points to about 10 million workers, out of an industrial labor force of some 30 million at the end of 1967. In the whole public economy, the proportion of workers on the minimum wage is certainly more than one-third of the labor force.<sup>10</sup> In 1965, the Moscow Scientific Research Institute on Labor estimated that the consumer budget which would permit a family of four (husband, wife, boy of 13, girl of 7 or 8) to live in conditions of “minimum material wellbeing,” would have had to be 206 rubles per month, that is, 51.5 rubles per head (in 1965 prices). Assuming that most of those who at that time earned 60 rubles or less per month were married with dependent children, it is reasonable to conclude that a substantial number of Soviet workers and employees lived below the poverty line.<sup>11</sup> Surely some relief was gained from the cultivation of small private family plots; nonetheless, the situation was far from satisfactory.

The plan proposes to raise the minimum wage to 70 rubles per month by 1975, to abolish the income tax on monthly earnings below 70 rubles, and to reduce the tax on monthly earnings of less than 90 rubles. (At present, the tax is 2.85 rubles on a gross monthly wage of 70 rubles, unless the wage-earner has four or more dependents, when the tax is 2 rubles.) Khrushchev’s promise to do away with the income tax altogether by October, 1965, is no longer mentioned. The process of raising minimum wages was to begin in 1971 (for railway workers and employees), and was to be completed in 1974–1975. From President Aleksei Kosygin’s report on the plan, it would appear that the greater number of those affected will benefit from the measure only in the last two years of the plan.<sup>12</sup>

To maintain incentive wage differentials, the increase in minimum wages is to be accompanied by upward adjustments in wage rates for middle-bracket workers and employees. The average gross monthly income

of workers and employees in the public sector, which was 122 rubles in 1970, is to climb to 146-149 rubles by 1975.

All these measures taken together are said to affect some 90 million working people. As of September 1, 1972, it is proposed to raise the salaries of schoolteachers and medical personnel simultaneously throughout the country by an average of about 20 per cent, and wages of teachers in preschool institutions by a "still higher" percentage. As of that date, too, the scholarship grants of students in higher educational institutions are to be raised by an average of 25 per cent, and those of technical school students by an average of 50 per cent. Zonal wage differentials in the far north and equivalent areas are to be hiked to attract labor into these regions.

Since 1965, most collective farms (*kolkhozy*) have introduced guaranteed wages to their members for work actually done, the rates of pay for the jobs being based on state farm (*soukhoz*) rates for equivalent work. Although the parity was not perfect, the difference between *soukhoz* and *kolkhoz* pay for comparable skills and labor inputs was small.<sup>13</sup> By the end of 1970, almost 95 per cent of Soviet collective farms were run on the guaranteed monthly wage system, and the old Stalinist work-day (*trudoden*) method of remuneration (which made the farmer a residual claimant on the farm's net income) had virtually disappeared. Since 1965, money wage payments have become the first charge on the income of the farm after direct production expenditures (e.g., amortization, seed fund, feed, fertilizer, fuel, repairs), but before payment of taxes, deductions for fixed and working capital, and cultural expenditures. In-kind payments to collective farmers have also become a priority charge on farm income. They are made after replenishment of the seed fund and after fulfillment of the state procurement quotas, but before deductions for livestock feed and reserve funds.

<sup>13</sup> One reason for the continuing difference between *kolkhoz* and *soukhoz* members' earnings for equivalent skills and labor input is that the average number of work-days per year put in by collective farmers is below that put in by state farm workers.

<sup>14</sup> See *Izvestia* (May 26, 1971), p. 3.

Although the plan only proposes to increase the minimum wage of public sector workers and employees (i.e., not that of collective farmers), it is clear that the differential between the average earnings of urban workers and employees, on the one hand, and collective farmers, on the other, will be further reduced in the period 1971-1975. In 1970 the guaranteed remuneration to collective farmers was 42 per cent above 1965; during 1971-1975 the average earnings of collective farmers are scheduled to rise by 30-35 per cent, while the average earnings of workers and employees in the public sector are planned to rise by 20-22 per cent.

This narrowing of the earnings gap between the city and collective agriculture may not by itself be enough to induce young technicians to move into rural areas where their skills are sorely needed but where the social amenities of employment and the availability and variety of consumer goods are well below those found in the cities.<sup>14</sup>

#### RETAINING THE DISPLACED

Low-paid, unskilled, manual jobs are to be gradually eliminated by mechanization and automation. This is a tall order in the present dual condition of the Soviet economy where mechanization and automation are uneven and unintegrated. But it may be presumed that progress in that direction will be made over the next five years. If this happens, the question arises: what do you do with all those charming ladies who today seek *kvas* on the sidewalks, sweep the streets, repair the roads, and climb up and down ladders on construction sites? Since there is no unemployment compensation in the Soviet Union (unemployment was decreed ended by Stalin in the 1930's and has not been recognized since) and, moreover, since joblessness is frowned on socially and legally as a manifestation of "hooligan parasitism," what do you do with, say, 10 million people whose means of livelihood is supplanted by machines?

The answer, of course, is that one teaches them to perform skilled jobs, some of which no doubt, the new machines create. This



asier said than done. One of the reasons why the workers offered low skills to begin with was presumably the real difficulty of teaching them higher skills. The Soviet Union is just not equipped right now for such a massive rehabilitation effort, and the plan does not spell out how the authorities intend to go about it.

At a level somewhat above the minimum wage, the solution may be a little easier. It has been tried at the Shchekino Chemical Combine where, according to reports, the volume of output rose 90 per cent in 30 months while the number of workers fell by 3,000. One Soviet source says that "the overwhelming majority of those freed remained at work [in the combine], but in new capacities."<sup>15</sup> But there were surely some who were fired. *Pravda* (October 1, 1963) admitted that "considerable problems arose from the relocation of labor. . . . Not every redundant worker could be transferred to another, new position."

Before February 27, 1970, the only machinery available to handle the problem consisted of (a) consultation between the employer and the plant trade union representative about alternative employment—this consultation taking place before dismissal, and (b) the rather patchy services provided by a network of placement offices under the State Committee for the Utilization of Labor Resources. (There exist also *de facto* employment exchanges run by various state organs, including municipal governments.) Retraining was, and apparently remains, the responsibility of the employing enterprise before termination of employment.

A Resolution of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers dated February 27, 1970, added a

<sup>15</sup> *Sovietskaia Estoniia* (September 18, 1968). Out of 700 workers released during the first year of operation, 170 were engineers and technicians. The total workforce of the combine has not been revealed.

<sup>16</sup> *Trud* (April 3, 1968).

<sup>17</sup> In 1970, the total amount of housing space (a concept more generous than that of *living space*) rose, according to official reports, to 11 square meters per urban resident. Almost all new housing space in recent years, according to the same report, has been used for single family occupancy, while in 1957 only 30 per cent was so used. *Pravda* (June 6, 1971), p. 2.

few sorely needed facilities: thus, "for personnel released as a result of improvement in the administrative apparatus, average earnings and uninterrupted work records" were thenceforth to be maintained for a period not exceeding three months, while the affected personnel were being retrained in production occupations. Before this decree, severance pay covered only two weeks' pay, while the average time spent in finding a new job was about one month.<sup>16</sup> "When released personnel are transferred to other parts of the country, state and Party agencies are instructed [by the Resolution] to grant them and their families housing space and priority accommodation in preschool institutions." New apartment construction during the plan is to reach 565–575 million square meters of housing space (this is not the same as actual living space) compared with 518 million square meters added during the Eighth Plan (1966–1970), and new schools for 8.1 million pupils are to be built. The number of places in preschool institutions is to rise by 2.5 million. All this will help, but it is not commensurate with the size of the problem created by the backlog in housing space (in 1970 urban per capita "living space" in the U.S.S.R. was 7.2 square meters, that is, 1.8 square meters below the minimum sanitary norm laid down in 1922), and by the plan's stated intent to machine the unskilled out of their menial jobs (some 600,000 workers in the construction industry alone, by 1972).<sup>17</sup> The apparent decision to continue and extend the Shchekino experiment will add to the problem.

Sooner or later, the Soviets will have to come to terms with the reality of frictional, technological and regional unemployment in a dynamic economy, and to take steps which will lessen the painful impact of modernization on the Soviet Union's less privileged citizens.

The most striking innovation is the introduction of a family allowance for those families (collective farmers included) whose aggregate per capita income does not exceed 50 rubles per month. The main beneficiaries are likely to be families with only one wage-



earner (the average Soviet family has 1.6 wage-earners). Two important caveats should be noted: (i) the allowance will be introduced only in 1974, and (ii) the per capita income is "aggregate," i.e., it includes "all types of income" (*sovokupny dokhod*). Unfortunately for many potential beneficiaries who could easily use a supplement to their monthly earnings, the notion of *sovokupny dokhod* (which might conceivably include estimated sums for paid vacations, subsidized housing, transfer payments, construction of schools, hospitals, and other facilities, as well as cash and in-kind income from private plots and livestock holdings) will tend to put most of them outside the provisions of the new allowance.

Soviet workers are entitled to various welfare benefits, including old age and disability pensions, compensation for sickness, pregnancy and childbirth, funeral benefits, pensions for survivors and war invalids' pensions. They are also entitled to free medical treatment and care, paid vacations and primary and secondary education. The plan promises to improve and extend the system of old age and disability pensions, raise the pensions of servicemen's families and workers who have lost their breadwinner, and increase the pensions of war invalids by an average of 33 per cent. Paid leaves of absence to attend sick children are to be lengthened, the allowances being equal to those paid for temporary disability. Paid leaves with full earnings for pregnancy and childbirth will be established for all working women, regardless of length of service. Allowances for meals in hospitals and in urban vocation schools are to be raised.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the measures is the attempt to bring the collective farmers nearer to urban workers and employees with respect to old age and disability pensions. Collective farmers were included in the state's welfare scheme for the first time in 1964, but until 1971 the procedures for calculating their old age and disability benefits were more restrictive than those applying to public sector workers and employees (especially with regard to length of service and qualifying age), and the rates of pensions

applicable to collective farmers were substantially lower than those applying to public sector workers and employees. In this, as in other respects, there is to be further convergence (*sblizhene*) between the two groups of citizens during the next five years. In fact it would be legitimate to infer from the measures taken since 1964 to narrow the gap between urban and collective farm conditions that the *kolkhozy* will eventually cease to exist as a peculiar institution in everything but name.

The minimum old age pension for public sector workers and employees has been, since July 1, 1971, 45 rubles per month, and the maximum remains at 120 rubles per month as before. The minimum old age pension for collective farmers has been, since the same date, 20 rubles a month, with a maximum of 120 rubles. (Until 1969, the minimum old age pension for a collective farmer with one dependent was only 12 rubles a month. Minimum pensions for families of collective farmers who have lost their breadwinners have been raised as of July 1, 1971, to 3 rubles per month (where three or more family members are unable to work), to 20 rubles per month (where two are unable to work), and to 16 rubles per month (where one is unable to work). At the same time (July 1, 1971), the procedures used for calculating old age pensions established for public sector personnel in 1956 have been extended to collective farmers. The collective farmers' disability pensions have also been raised in 1971. They now range from 16 rubles to 3 rubles per month for work injury or occupational disease, and from 20 to 30 rubles per month for general disease.

(Continued on page 242)

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*"As persuasive as the arguments for continued collective control may be, . . . the evidence points to a personal power struggle . . . and to the gradual emergence of Brezhnev in first place."*

## Collective or Personal Rule in the U.S.S.R.?

BY DAVID T. CATTELL

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IS THE POWER STRUGGLE for a successor to Nikita Khrushchev in the last act? Is the doctrine of collective rule about to be filed away again? Is Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev emerging as the new personal ruler of the Soviet empire? Collective rule by an oligarchy of Soviet leaders has lasted six years, much longer than usual. Or has the situation changed in spite of Brezhnev and is oligarchy becoming institutionalized? Is it now accepted that the complex Soviet society and economy cannot be successfully run according to the whims of one man? Did Khrushchev's "hare-brained schemes" show the folly and dangers of personal rule?

Beginning with Brezhnev, the contenders for power are 64 years or older. The only young contender, Aleksander Shelepin, who is 52, seems to have been effectively removed from the struggle. What kind of long term ability can an old leader provide? As persuasive as the arguments for continued collective rule may be, however, the evidence points to a personal power struggle (although at a less dramatic pace than previously) and to the gradual emergence of Brezhnev in first

place. The recently published Khrushchev memoirs, genuine or contrived by the K.G.B., revealed little that was new but again emphasized how personal intrigues dominate the life of the Soviet court.<sup>1</sup>

As in a Byzantine court, the scheming of the last couple of years in the Kremlin has been hidden as much as possible from the public eye. During the last year even the second echelon of the hierarchy, represented by the Central Committee of the party, is being kept out of the contest. After the embarrassing uncertainties during the December, 1969, and July, 1970, plenums of the Central Committee, when the lack of unanimity in the Politbureau became the subject of debate, the more recent meetings of the Central Committee have been curtailed to a few hours duration. The 24th Congress, delayed until the end of March and early April, 1971, was also carefully planned as a model of control and unanimity.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers* was published in the West, and a dispute immediately arose as to its authenticity. Khrushchev issued a statement denying he had sent any memoirs abroad for publication (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, November 17, 1970). Most authorities feel that the memoirs are at least partially authentic but have probably been cut and mangled by the K.G.B.

<sup>2</sup> See also the article by Adam Ulam in this issue.

The evidence of Brezhnev's bid for personal rule has been the rise of his cult of personality, his predominant power in the party and the party's growing ascendancy over the bureaucracy. Brezhnev began by assuming the title of General Secretary rather than First Secretary of the Party in 1966. He packed the Party Secretariat with his supporters and tried to raise the Secretariat to a position coequal with the Politbureau. Thus, following in the steps of his predecessors

sors, he has tried to gain control of the party as the key political institution. At the same time, Brezhnev's name is openly being pushed to the forefront in every way by his followers. The publication of his collected speeches and articles in August, 1970, was greeted with a fanfare in all the leading journals and newspapers. At celebrations such as the fiftieth anniversaries of the Azerbaijan and Armenian Republics and at the various congresses and plenums of the Communist parties throughout the Soviet empire, Brezhnev's speeches are given great prominence, broadcast and published nationwide.

Thus, in the last two years, Brezhnev has managed to launch himself publicly as the primary leader, not just the first among equals in the Politbureau. But despite a two-year campaign, the evidence would indicate that his bid within the Politbureau has not yet succeeded; he still does not have absolute control; and he has yet to try to purge his opponents from that body. The confusion in announcing a postponement of the Party Congress during the July, 1970, Plenum of the Central Committee just a few days after Brezhnev had promised that the Congress would meet in 1970, and the long delay until February, 1971, in publishing the goals of the ninth five year plan (1971-1975) seem to indicate continued disagreement at the top level. There is nothing radical in the nature of the targets or the organization of the new five year plan to explain why it was announced many months late.

It is also clear that Brezhnev has not been able to pack the party cadres with his own men, at least until the meeting of the 24th Party Congress. Surveying the shifts of important party secretaries at the republic and provincial level during the last year, it appears that in Kazakhstan, which has been in dispute, Brezhnev's position has been strengthened but not completely secured. He also seems to have lost out in Leningrad, long a crucial and vital party center. Furthermore, his position in the second largest republic, the Ukraine, seems in doubt. His shutting off of the Central Committee from the debates and giving it only formal power may be a

further indication that his control is not yet secure. The advances he made at the 24th Party Congress by adding his supporters to the Central Committee and Politbureau and advancing the control of the party over the government apparatus has still to show its effect. A tentative appraisal suggests that he may still be just short of his goal.

The composition and structure of the opposing factions in the Politbureau and their support in the second echelons of the party and government are not clear. The leader of the opposition appear to be President Nikolai Podgorny and Mikhail Suslov. It has been rumored that Premier Aleksei Kosygin would like to retire from politics. There is also some evidence that the opposition may fluctuate, depending on the issue, and may be able to prevent Brezhnev from acting on his own on certain issues.

Although personal rivalry dominates the power struggle and will determine the outcome, some policy and ideological issues also seem to be in dispute. It is not always clear which faction supports which position, but knowing this relationship is perhaps not so important as understanding the nature of the issues and the range of differences, since positions taken by leaders during the power struggle are purely tactical. Regardless of which faction they head or support, none of the old men in the Politbureau has shown any desire to stray far from traditional policies and all, at least at the moment, agree to resist a return of a powerful secret police.

## AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT

Four major areas of disagreement have come to the surface: (1) Should the party play an increasing role in the control and direction of the economy and society? A traditionally conceived, the party is supposed to issue overall directives to all parts of Soviet life and to check on their fulfillment but it is not intended to administer directly either the economy or government. Its only direct administrative task is in the area of political indoctrination. For tactical reasons of power and out of fear of the growing government and economic hierarchy, Brezhnev

like Stalin and Khrushchev before him, is pushing for direct party interference in all affairs. Obviously Podgorny, Kosygin and others not predominantly associated with the party apparatus are resisting this. For the moment, Brezhnev seems to have made significant gains by upgrading the technical qualifications of the party cadres and expanding the party rules.

(2) Will the transition to communism bring about a fundamental shift in the social structure in the direction of an "all people's state" as advocated by Khrushchev? The implications of this issue could be radical indeed and, in fact, the intellectual underground in the Soviet Union favors going as far in the direction of a real democracy as an "all people's state" would suggest. But as a force in numbers or influence the underground is too weak to affect the debate, except adversely, i.e., those who oppose any restructuring of society point to the demands of the underground and the experience in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as the horrible example. Within the party "establishment" the debate is very much more restricted. Most of the debate is theoretical, but it does affect the practical issues of expanded mass organizations, limited autonomy for economic enterprises and greater stress on local government. On the theoretical level, against the more conservative party journals, the party newspaper, *Pravda*, apparently led by Podgorny in the Politbureau, supports the immediate introduction of some Communist-type features in the system. On the practical issues, at least, Brezhnev seems to be the arbitrator, although his compromises seem to have favored the conservative side. The mass public organs stressed by Khrushchev are still given lip service, but have significantly declined in practice. There has also been a conscious effort to increase the power and resources of local governments as purveyors to the masses. But the great economic reform beginning in 1965, which among other things was to advance the autonomy of enterprises, has been sabotaged by the bureaucracy, and the economy is increasingly run by decrees from Moscow. Even the idea of a new constitution seems to

have been shelved indefinitely, despite the appointment of a new constitutional commission after Khrushchev's ouster in December, 1966.

(3) Should the traditional emphasis on capital development and defense be shifted in favor of consumer-oriented production? This is an old issue, the current debate for which began in the power struggle after Stalin's death. In the last few years, neither side has won more than modest advances. In spite of the rhetoric about the great consumer advances to be expected in the ninth five year plan, a careful study of the goals and cautious pledges indicates that only a minor shift in favor of the consumer can be expected. Furthermore, if previous practice is any indication, these promises will be sacrificed to meet any crisis.

(4) Closely associated with increasing consumer production is the question as to how the population can be mobilized to strengthen its active support of the system and improve labor discipline. On the one hand, the supporters of greater consumer output argue that the primary answer is material incentives. On the other hand, the conservatives, who seem to include Brezhnev, argue for indoctrination, increased discipline of the population and perhaps even greater repression. The conservative position has tended to dominate over the last two or three years. With the strong emphasis on law and order, the police and legal system has been brought back under tight central control. In September, 1970, the Ministry of Justice (abolished by Khrushchev in 1956) was restored.

The legal and extra-legal campaign against deviant intellectuals and artists continues to mount. While the sterility of Soviet writing and literary criticism is deplored (*Pravda*, June 15, 1971), ideological control is tightened. All liberals have been removed as editors, and only a few moderates keep the literary scene from being completely dominated by the rigidly orthodox. Even after Alexander Solzhenitsyn's removal from the writers' union, he has continued to be the focus of bitter attack, although he is rarely mentioned by name. The press did, how-

ever, confine itself to short denunciations in December, 1970, when Solzhenitsyn received the Nobel Peace Prize (*Pravda*, December 17). The writers' congress in June-July, 1971, was without debate and was dominated by the ideologues condemning the deviants and praising guidance by the party. In a new campaign, the regime has extended its criticism to scientific institutes for their ideological laxness, and the party has been ordered to tighten its surveillance of their activities.

Next to ideological laxness, the regime seems to regard alcoholism as a major cause of poor labor discipline and hooliganism. The press is full of editorials on the subject and suggestions on ways to curb it. In practice, however, the regime has moved cautiously, reducing slightly the availability of vodka and increasing the social and legal pressure against alcoholics.

Other facets of the crusade for better labor discipline include condemnation of the chicanery and illegal methods used by many parents and students to get students into institutes of higher learning. In contrast, the propaganda stresses, the true Soviet man loves all kinds of work, including technical and manual labor. Looking to the future, the campaign deplores the decline of the Soviet birthrate and presses for an increase in the size of urban families. This issue is likely to become increasingly important. Finally, as part of the program of developing discipline and in order to please the military, the regime has placed new emphasis on military training as part of the curriculum at all levels of schooling.

For all the disagreement and seriousness of the issues, the solutions proposed by factions in the Kremlin amount to nothing more than tinkering with the organizational structure. The Kremlin has avoided real reforms, such as a flexible pricing system to make the incentive system work or increased rents for housing to provide the income necessary for improving domestic services and better quality

housing. At the beginning of 1965 the economic reforms seemed to indicate a small step toward fundamental reform, but they have been effectively sabotaged. No serious efforts have been made since.

It is not surprising that the changes which have been made by the collective leadership have often been minor and vacillating. The need to compromise does not make for clear decisive policies. This is perhaps the major argument being used for a return to personal rule. The Communist leadership has a deep fear of indecisiveness. Certainly a resolution of the power struggle could resolve the division of resources among consumer goods, capital development and defense. However, an analysis of some of the wavering and unsettled policies suggests causes other than divided leadership. Take, for example, the policy of curtailing dissent while refraining from using all the police powers of the state. While many opposition intellectuals have been condemned to work camps and in some asylums, other well known dissenters like Solzhenitsyn, the musician Mstislav Rostropovich, the biologist Zhores A. Medvedev and the physicist and academician Andrei Sakharov have thus far escaped.<sup>3</sup> The underground press (*samizdat*) also continues to flourish and regularly publishes a newsletter (*The Chronicle*). There is also the ambivalent treatment of Jews: persecuting and discriminating against them for their alleged support of international Zionism, and yet backing down in response to international pressure by commuting the death sentence of Jewish hijackers and allowing more and more Jews to emigrate to Israel.

The dilemma presented by these policies seems not to arise from the power struggle alone. In each case, the basis for not using maximum force seems to come from fear that the mobilization of such authority could only be effected by expanding the role of the secret police and might give rise to a new reign of terror. From the underground there is already evidence that the K.G.B. has been expanding its files.

The campaign for greater labor discipline without drastically increasing the penalties

<sup>3</sup> On November 4, 1970, Sakharov and two other physicists announced the formation of a Human Rights Committee.



for violating discipline also illustrates the timidity of the regime. In this case, there is not only the danger of encouraging the secret police, but the fear of a mass reaction. The lesson of the widespread riots of the Polish workers in December, 1970, against unpopular restrictions and price increases has undoubtedly been taken to heart.

Hesitation in solving the needs for educational reform and the pusillanimous attitude toward allowing industrial managers and scientists more autonomy point up still another dilemma. It is widely recognized that managers need to make more decisions as production becomes more complex and that the Soviet Union needs a broader, more creative educational system in place of the rote, narrowly technical training of today. But logic seems to give way to fear—based on experience in East Europe—that any relaxation of strict controls and any encouragement of individual creativity may get out of control and be dangerous.

Finally, there is one set of vacillating policies which cannot easily be explained by the fears of the leadership or their differences. In the past five years, two organizational changes at the lowest level of the party have been suggested. First, it was proposed (and seemingly accepted) several years ago that the system of political agitators directed by the party be turned into a system of *politinformators*. Traditionally, agitators were recruited as much as possible from the masses and through seminars and handbooks were trained to inform, mobilize and report on a small group of fellow workers. But with the higher level of education of the masses it was felt that they needed political informants with more comprehensive training. The new *politinformators*, as a result, are more carefully trained and generally specialize in one area of politics. They work together in teams with a much larger group of citizens.

The second reform, of more recent origin, proposed that the bureau elected by the members to head the primary organization of the party be enlarged from 9–15 members to as many as 50, depending on the size of the primary organization. Both reforms were

apparently being implemented, but in the last two years there have been growing signs of disagreement and even of retreat. If Brezhnev is in complete control of the party apparatus, why this uncertainty? Is it because of Brezhnev's own indecision, the resistance of the lower echelons of the party, or opposition by Brezhnev's rivals, who still are able to exercise some influence in the party?

Vacillation is usually a symptom of weakness, but in the short run the indecisiveness and the hesitancy to change characteristic of current Soviet internal policies may not be signs of weakness. The cautiousness of the Kremlin leadership must be analyzed against the background of the continued growth of the Soviet economy. Except for an occasional bad crop year as in 1969, overall production has grown at a respectable, if not a spectacular rate; real wages and living standards have continued their slow advance; and the defense of the country has not been sacrificed. There are no signs of real mass discontent and the last two good years of harvest should help ease food supplies again. The intellectual dissidents are only an annoyance.

Thus wariness about change during a stable, prosperous period is not sufficient evidence that the system cannot respond to a real threat. In fact, a serious threat from any quarter might resolve most of the differences, doubts and even the competition for personal leadership in the Kremlin. As long as the system of central authority is still intact the road to quick mobilization is available to meet a crisis. But in the long run, resistance to change and uncertainty could bring weakness. And short of a crisis, reforms are not likely under the present leaders, individually or collectively, and will have to wait for a new generation of leaders.

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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# Soviet Statement on Disarmament

*On June 11, 1971, the Soviet Communist party's General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, spoke to an election meeting in Moscow about Soviet foreign policy. Excerpts from his remarks about disarmament follow:*

The struggle for disarmament is a difficult matter. Here, just as in many other problems of foreign policy, one comes up against the stubborn resistance of the imperialist forces. Nevertheless, we regard the proposals put forward by the 24th Congress of the C.P.S.U. not as propaganda slogans but as slogans of action.

A positive outcome [of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks] would answer, in our opinion, the interests of the peoples of both countries.

The decisive factor for the success of these talks is strict observance of the principle of equal security for both sides, renunciation of attempts to secure any unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the United States administration will also take a constructive stand.

[The desirability of] the principle of equal security is recognized in words by Washington, too. Actually, however, the American side simply cannot make itself carry [this principle] into life consistently. In the United States for example, hue and cry are raised time and again about the Soviet defense programs—particularly on the eve of adopting a new military budget in Washington.

The measures we take to strengthen our defenses are depicted at the same time as something well nigh treachery, a direct threat to the success of the talks.

But on what grounds, we are entitled to ask, has Washington to expect from us renunciation of the already adopted programs when the United States administration itself, during the period of the talks, has taken several very big decisions on building up its strategic forces?

It is high time to discard this double yardstick, double standard, in appraising one's own actions and the actions of the other side.

And this applies not only to missiles. The United States propaganda machinery has launched a wide campaign concerning the Soviet navy. Washington, you see, sees a threat in that our warships appear in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and other seas.

But at the same time, United States politicians consider it normal and natural for their Sixth Fleet to be constantly present in the Mediterranean hard by the side of the Soviet Union, as it were, and for the Seventh Fleet to be stationed off the coasts of China and Indochina.

We have never thought and do not think now that it is an ideal situation when the navies of great powers are sailing for a long time at the other end of the world, away from their native coasts. We are ready to solve this problem, but to make an equal bargain, as they say.

The Soviet Union is ready to discuss any proposals on the basis of such principles. We, for our part, advanced a series of initiatives at the [24th Party] Congress—for banning all types of weapons of mass destruction, for curtailing the military budgets of states, for full termination of nuclear weapons tests.

We also proposed to convene a conference of five nuclear powers—the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, the United States, Britain and France.

We are awaiting a reply to these proposals. The world public is also waiting for it.

[The Soviet proposal to reduce armed forces and armaments in Europe] is a big and independent question. The practical results on the way to a solution would be of great importance for a detente and lasting peace on the European continent. We may note with satisfaction that the Soviet Union view on this question has met with certain interest in most of the Western countries. The recent NATO session in Lisbon also had to take up this question.

However we have not yet received a clear answer. We are repeatedly asked whether our proposal involves only foreign armed forces or covers the national armed forces as well? We would like to reply thus: we are prepared to discuss both the one and the other. On our part we reiterate once again that we are ready to give this important complex of questions due attention. It goes without saying that we shall act in close contact with our allies.

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# BOOK REVIEWS

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## NEW BOOKS ON THE SOVIET UNION

- THE SOVIET POLITICAL MIND. BY ROBERT C. TUCKER. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971. 304 pages, notes and index, \$8.95.)
- SOVIET AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS. EDITED BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN AND GEORGE GINSBURG. (New York: New York University Press, 1971. 211 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$8.95.)
- POLITICS AND HISTORY IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY NANCY WHITTIER HEER. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1971. 319 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$12.50.)
- THE SOVIET UNION. BY DEV MURARKA. (New York: Walker and Company, 1971. 240 pages, notes, selected bibliography, biographical notes and index, \$7.50.)
- THE SOVIET UNION. BY ELIZABETH KOUTAISOFF. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. 288 pages, appendices, selected bibliography and index, \$8.50.)
- SOCIALIST MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING. BY NICOLAS SPULBER. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971. 235 pages, notes, guides to literature and index, \$10.00.)
- RUSSIA'S RULERS: THE KHRUSHCHEV PERIOD. EDITED BY LESTER A. SOBEL. (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1971. 394 pages and index, \$5.45, paper.)
- ASPECTS OF RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1917-1967. BY RICHARD MARSHALL, JR., THOMAS BIRD AND ANDREW BLANE. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971. 489 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$19.75.)
- DYNAMICS OF COUNTERREVOLUTION IN EUROPE, 1870-1956: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK. BY ARNO J. MAYER. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971. 173 pages and selected bibliography, \$7.00.)
- THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE: SUCCESS OR FAILURE. EDITED BY DANIEL R. BROWER. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. 129 pages and suggested readings, \$3.00.)
- A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE: FROM ALEXANDER II TO KHRUSHCHEV. BY LAZAR VOLIN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. 644 pages, notes and index, \$18.50.)
- THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1917: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS. EDITED BY DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 320 pages and index, \$8.95.)
- FAREWELL TO THE DON: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IN THE JOURNALS OF BRIG. H. N. H. WILLIAMSON. EDITED BY JOHN HARRIS. (New York: The John Day Company, 1971. 288 pages and index of names, \$6.95.)
- THE MARQUIS DE CUSTINE AND HIS RUSSIA IN 1839. BY GEORGE KENNAN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 145 pages, notes and index, \$6.00.)
- THE COMMUNIST REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE. BY RICHARD F. STAAR. Revised Edition. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1971. 304 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$3.95, paper.)
- BREST-LITOVSK: THE FORGOTTEN PEACE, MARCH 1918. BY JOHN WHEELER-BENNETT. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971. 478 pages, appendices and index, \$3.25, paper.)
- RUSSIA'S OTHER WRITERS: SELECTIONS FROM SAMIZDAT LITERATURE. SELECTED BY MICHAEL SCAMMELL. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. 216 pages, \$6.95.)

## MOSCOW AND THE MISSILE RACE

(Continued from page 221)

memory of Vietnam and the growing pressure of domestic social priorities will increasingly circumscribe the United States' future willingness (or ability) to maintain encumbering international commitments. Thus it is altogether possible that the combination of American preoccupation with problems at home and a world free of any imminent danger of nuclear war will offer the Soviets significant new inroads through which to expand their influence and presence. Indeed, post-Khrushchev improvements in Soviet naval and conventional theater-force capabilities and Moscow's increasing political-military involvement in the Middle East both suggest that the Soviet Union has already come to discover many of the advantages to be gained from its recent accession to full-fledged super-power status.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> For further commentary, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *The Soviet Quest for More Globally Mobile Military Power* (The RAND Corporation, RM-5554-PR, December 1967).

## SOVIET MAN IN THE NINTH PLAN

(Continued from page 234)

The Ninth Plan's provisions to ensure higher standards of living for Soviet citizens appear to be realistic. However, numerous institutional obstacles will have to be overcome if intentions are to be translated into effective action. The effort to bring the collective farmers into the Soviet community on a footing comparable to that enjoyed by state sector workers and employees is to be continued. Assuming no sudden, sizable defense expenditures and the ability of the consumer lobby to keep the "metal eaters" in check, a modest but real improvement in the Soviet people's material wellbeing may be expected in the course of the next five years. This does not mean, however, that by 1975 the Soviet Union will turn the corner, so to speak, and become a consumer society.

The Ninth Plan is consumer-oriented in a discreet, puritanical way; it most certainly is not a Magna Charta of consumerism. Personal consumption will probably suffer, as it has in the past, from shoddy quality and erratic deliveries, given the plan's renewed flirtation with bureaucratic remedies for economic problems. The reform spirit of the late 1960's is dead, and administrative, directive planning from the center once again ride high. Soviet society will retain its swaddling character; there is nothing much wrong with that provided the swaddling does not stifle personal initiative at the grassroots.<sup>18</sup> One cannot, alas, escape the impression that the bureaucrats will see to it that any manifestation of centrally unapproved economic patriotism is promptly and thoroughly extinguished.

<sup>18</sup> "State discipline at all links of the national economy shall be consolidated in every way." *Directives*, p. 75. "Discipline shall be strengthened and every industrial and office worker shall bear greater responsibility for his own work." *Ibid.* p. 47.

## THE TWENTY-FOURTH PARTY CONGRESS

(Continued from page 226)

the U.S.S.R. The elevation to full membership in the Politburo of yet another Ukrainian and of a Central Asian is also a way of acknowledging the potential seriousness of the nationality problem in the U.S.S.R. where the majority of the population is for the first time of non-Great Russian nationality<sup>1</sup> and where other nations, especially the Turkic ones, are reproducing at a much faster rate than the Russians.

The regime obviously does not propose to embark on any campaign of liberalization such as was intermittently attempted by Khrushchev. It is convinced that its course since 1965 has been correct: i.e., to discourage excessive discussion about the bad old times (Stalin), to repress what it considers undesirable new currents in literature and

<sup>1</sup> The latest Soviet census puts the Great Russian at 53 per cent of the population, but it is the general feeling of demographers that this is a weighted figure and that the true figure is under 50 per cent.

the arts but at the same time to do so without lapsing into extreme repression and intimidation à la Stalin. The present ruling group is old; the Politburo's average age must be about 60, and the newcomers to the highest party councils are people who have been around in high bureaucratic positions for years. Their motto seems to be "don't trust men under fifty" and one of the youngest and most energetic members of the Politburo, Alexander Shelepin, was dropped in standing on the list of its members as read to the Congress (the listing as given in the press on the other hand followed Leonid Brezhnev's name in alphabetical order). Judging from the speeches, one cannot see Brezhnev's position as comparable to Khrushchev's at the height of his power (1957–1962) not to mention Stalin's. Some speakers were more fulsome in their praises of the Secretary General than others, but an important clue is found in the fact that a few Politburo members did not speak at the Congress at all and thus took no ostentatious part in endorsing policies laid down by Brezhnev.

As usual, the effect which the leadership tries to promote is one of monolithic unity, but one suspects that this is not the case and that on a number of issues (China, how far to favor a consumer economy, how vigorously to repress intellectual dissent) there are considerable differences of opinion. The current leadership team is a fairly closed oligarchy, and the four top leaders (Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksei Kosygin, Nikolai Podgorny, Mikhail Suslov) are at or above the age of retirement for American businessmen and professors. Hence some vigorous jockeying for position must be going on both in and at the level just below the Politburo. One ought to be ready, therefore, for some changes in the leadership fairly soon, certainly within the next two or three years.

In brief, the 24th Congress reflected the stagnation and conservatism of the present leadership; a measure of confidence about the economic problems at home; serious apprehension about dilemmas in world communism; and considerable hope that, as in the recent past, the errors and disarray of the

capitalist world would provide the best propaganda for communism at home and abroad.

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## SOVIET TUTELAGE IN EAST EUROPE

*(Continued from page 209)*

to seek "revenge," that conventional warfare in Europe is barely if at all conceivable, that the ideological foundations of Soviet-East European relations have long been compromised already—if these assumptions are valid, then Soviet policy in East Europe is based on confusing if not flimsy assumptions. Put simply, the Soviet Union is holding on to East Europe because it is accustomed to doing so and because neither the West nor China is interested as yet in backing East Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Without profound outside support, East Europe—divided into relatively weak nation-states—is incapable of obtaining more leeway from its powerful neighbor.

The future of Soviet-East European relations thus depends on the future of Germany and of Peking-Moscow and Peking-Washington developments. The international system is entering a new phase of great power maneuverings, the outcome of which will have considerable bearing on whether or not the Soviet Union will be compelled to redefine the meaning and significance of its interests in East Europe.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

*(Continued from page 214)*

over Transylvania). Even worse, East Germany might try to advance her interests against West Germany, an attempt which could match the United States against the Soviet Union.

In the near future, the Soviet Union is also unlikely to give up any territory it seized from East Europe because of the Soviet estimate of its buffer value even in the nuclear age, although this could change with any Soviet reexamination of East Europe's worth if a limited war in Europe appears unlikely or infeasible. But the Soviet Union's



refusal to surrender its East European lands is equally unlikely for political reasons. If the Soviets should return any East European territory they have occupied since the war, they would unravel their position in the east by giving China a concrete excuse to renew her claims against the Soviet Union. The Soviets are thus locked in on both the east and west against any territorial concessions either to their Communist neighbors or others, such as Japan's claim to the Northern Islands. Lastly, the Soviets are unlikely to loosen whatever political control they still exercise in East Europe voluntarily since any additional freedom to develop East Europe's own road to socialism would encourage others to resist Soviet influence and would specifically encourage China further to challenge the Soviets. In effect, Soviet concessions to East Europe might be interpreted as indicating that the Soviet Union was bowing out of the running for leadership of the Communist world, something it may yet be forced to do under pressure of uncontrollable nationalism in East Europe and elsewhere. The Soviets are still good Marxists in the sense that they have demonstrated on many occasions the validity of a Marxist postulation that no ruling class gives up its power voluntarily.

Consequently, in view of China's challenge in the east, the cost of current inertia and maintaining the status quo in East Europe is less than the cost of initiating a dynamic Soviet policy in East Europe; by making concessions and initiating change, the Soviets would generate uncertainties they are unwilling to face. Therefore the Soviets face a paradox: they have less and less to gain from overwhelmingly dominating East Europe and yet their resistance to changing the status quo in East Europe is increased by the negative imperatives of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In a word, Soviet resistance to change in East Europe is, in large measure, a reflection of the Sino-Soviet dispute. And as the dispute has deepened, it has led the Soviets to the current dual-track policy in Europe. Thus the Soviet Union deals with West Germany in a conciliatory manner, as a way of disarming the threat in the West and of

forestalling Sino-German collusion; at the same time it deals harshly with East Europe (as reflected in the 1968 Czech invasion) in order to secure the Soviet buffer zone in the west while facing a hostile China in the east. The current conciliatory policy toward West Germany is an updated variant of the traditional Soviet solution of a two-front threat. Before World War II the Soviet Union, while fighting the Japanese in the east, signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939. Then, after defeating the Japanese (and in order to ready themselves to meet the Hitler attack in June, 1941), the Soviets signed a neutrality pact with Japan earlier that year.

In sum, the Soviet political position vis-à-vis China today is in many ways weaker than it was earlier, given the new flexibility displayed by China towards the United States, East Europe and others. At the earlier stages of this new policy, the Soviets were driven to consider the use of force against China to compensate for their eroding political position, much as they were forced to consider (and actually used force) in the Czech case in 1968 despite the political costs they incurred as a result of the invasion.

In the Chinese case, Soviet thinking on using military force to make up for political weakness was reflected in the Soviet tri balloons in the summer of 1969, designed to elicit Western reaction to the possible Soviet use of force against China. This seemed a credible possibility at the time, given the Soviet armed action against Czechoslovakia on a year earlier. Indeed it may have motivated the Chinese to initiate and speed up the current flexibility in their foreign policy.

However, in 1969, the Soviets restrained themselves from using force and opted instead for the political and diplomatic approach of dealing with West Germany as the United States on issues such as SALT and Berlin in order to mitigate the challenge on other flanks and to prevent the "collusion" of these rivals with China. The Soviets have tried, unsuccessfully so far, to engage Japan in a similar context. The unanswered key question for the Soviet leadership is comp

ated. Let us suppose that no satisfactory *modus vivendi* is worked out with the United States, Germany or Japan, and that the Soviets are confronted by growing Chinese nuclear missile capabilities which reduce the Soviet military margin and put the Soviet population and military centers under the nuclear gun. Suppose further that this is accompanied by active challenges on the Sino-Soviet border and successful Chinese diplomacy of "encircling" the Soviet Union, including widening the "Second Front" in Europe. Then would the Soviets feel compelled to employ their one, still clear advantage in strategic military capabilities? Such a question apparently was on the Soviet policy agenda in 1969 and it could come up again. It was not acted on in 1969, with some of the Soviet military having grave reservations about any lightly taken decision on the "adventurist" use of force against the Chinese. But it might not be voted down if the Chinese doggedly pursue their challenge in the far more grim politico-military context described above.

For the Soviets may then perceive the threat from China to be greater than it might be in fact, at least as it might appear to outside observers. (It should be recalled that no outside observers believed that the "spring" developments of 1968 in Czechoslovakia called for Soviet use of force; yet the Soviet perceptions of danger to Soviet interests were obviously far different, as the Czechs learned to their sorrow.) The extreme Soviet perception (but one not so extreme as to be ruled out) of a possible need ultimately to deal with China by force is what has made China the number one problem in Soviet foreign policy today.

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## SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

*(Continued from page 197)*

A modest entry in the Middle East oil industry and visits of Soviet naval units to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf attest to it further.

## THE FAR EAST

At the center of the Asian equation is

China, a great power by virtue of her size and her nuclear capability. And next to China is Japan, possessing economic strength which makes her potentially a great power indeed. In the days when Japan was a ward of the United States and China was a junior ally of the U.S.S.R., the theory of the bipolar world bore some relation to the realities of power politics in Asia. Now the Soviet Union and China wage their own cold war. Most important, they face each other in armed hostility along the longest land frontier in the world.

In this situation, it is noteworthy that the Soviet Union's *détente* policy in Europe helped it to concentrate massive military forces on the Chinese border, to compel China to negotiate on frontier disputes under threat of war (as it did in 1969), and to keep that pressure on indefinitely. China, for her part, could not feel secure when she faced military threats from the Russians in the north and from the Americans in the south; thus, when it was clear to Peking that the Americans were leaving Vietnam, the United States became eligible as a counterweight to the enemy in the north and to a resurgent Japan. It was also true that the United States would be in a far more favorable position in dealing with either of the other points of the triangle if it were in normal contact, able to negotiate and find common interests, with the other. The American decision to accept Communist China as a reality of international life was overdue. The announcement of the President's visit was an extra flourish which gave added emphasis to the new shape of an old game called balance of power.

In other parts of Asia, American and Soviet policies are in conflict but not in the old sense of a two-sided cold war. The Soviet Union would like to see a weakening of the United States' ties with Japan, but Japan is no third-world vacuum. The Soviets have had little leverage either in the economic deals they have offered or in the activities of the Japanese Communist party.

In Vietnam, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have fueled opposite sides of the

war, but it is instructive that in the past few years the United States has found itself appealing for Moscow's help in persuading Hanoi to give acceptable terms for withdrawal. Moscow did not have that kind of influence in Hanoi, and what influence the Soviet leadership had it wished to expend for itself in its rivalry with China. It was also useful to have the war drag on to drain American attention and resources from other places and to feed the fires of isolationism. And the United States, which in seeking a way out of Vietnam has been concerned with many factors, may have been least concerned over advantages for the Soviet Union.

Again, in South Asia, the pattern has been shifting. Since the India-Pakistan war of 1965 the Soviet Union and the United States have had nearly parallel policies, trying to keep some standing with both sides and to discourage a renewal of the war. But China is also in the picture as a friend of Pakistan and as a potential enemy of India. The United States chose not to undertake large-scale arming of India, and the Soviet Union became the major supplier, gaining correspondingly in influence. When the crisis over East Pakistan burst into violence in the spring of 1971, these trends were intensified. China expressed her support of the Pakistan government. The United States lost influence in India because it refused to condemn Pakistan and cut off aid. The Soviet Union sacrificed its position in Pakistan in order to seize the opportunity to become the principal patron and supporter of India, a position made formal and projected for 20 years by a treaty signed on August 9, 1971.

### THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Was this step, coming soon after the Soviet-Egyptian 15-year treaty of May 27, the sign of a new Soviet approach? It called to mind an earlier Soviet proposal for a collective security system of Asian states including the U.S.S.R. and presumably aimed against China and the United States.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Hemen Ray, "Soviet Diplomacy in Asia," *Problems of Communism*, March/April, 1970, pp. 46-49.

Great uncertainties exist in both countries regarding the future of their relations. The United States has not found a substitute for its 20-year policy of containing Soviet power. The Nixon administration's "doctrine" and the various changes it has made are a part of the search for a new policy. In the Soviet Union, the leadership is also burdened by the past and groping toward the future.

Both sides now appear to accept the general proposition that war on the grand scale is not a rational proposition. Both know that the use of force on a lesser scale cannot be ruled out. They also know they have a common interest in keeping violence within safe bounds, but they have not had the statesmanship to find sure ways of doing so.

The Soviet Union, despite the security inherent in its strength, is capable of violent action. It is troubled by the old nightmare of encirclement, now in a new capitalist-Communist form. Within the "world socialist system," so central to its view of the future, its former unchallenged dominance has been beset by sectarians of the right (Yugoslavia) and of the left (China). A military move against either, with all its dangers to world peace, cannot be excluded. The new Soviet role of global power may bring involvements which come to be seen as vital interests, a situation combining inflexibility with a high risk of war. Nor is it impossible that the United States, if it sees itself being pushed by the Soviets out of areas deemed of vital importance, will resort to force on the ground of "better now than later."

Working in the other direction is the tendency in both countries to see their direct confrontation as receding from the center place in their respective foreign policies. China and Japan and perhaps a united West Europe are coming on the stage as major actors. Countries of the third world have proved to be beyond control by outside powers, or not worth fighting about. Finally, with the passage of time the problems change. The difficulty is that the Soviet Union and the United States, being largely self-contained and parochial societies, may be the last to recognize the change.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of August, 1971, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Berlin Crisis

Aug. 23—The ambassadors of the U.S., Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. reach agreement on the text of a draft treaty on the future of West Berlin; the treaty must be approved by the 4 governments. It is reported that the agreement includes provisions regulating access to West Berlin and periodic visits by West Berliners to East Berlin and East Germany.

### Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)

Aug. 7—The Comecon plan for greater economic integration of East Europe, adopted 10 days ago, is published by the member states.

### Disarmament

Aug. 3—The 7th session in the talks on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT) is held by U.S. and Soviet delegations in Helsinki.

Aug. 5—The U.S. and the Soviet Union present the text of a draft treaty to ban biological weapons to a 25-nation Disarmament Conference meeting in Geneva.

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

Aug. 24—Speaking to a special council session of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Rolf Dahrendorf, the leading trade official of the Common Market, condemns U.S. President Richard Nixon's imposition of a 10 per cent import surtax; he warns that the E.E.C. may exercise its right, under the Gatt rules, to claim reparations for any trading damages.

## Federation of Arab Republics

(See also *Jordan; Syria*)

Aug. 18—The heads of state of Syria, Libya and the U.A.R., meeting in Damascus to approve a constitution for the Federation of Arab Republics, discuss the crisis in Jordan.

Aug. 20—The 3 Arab heads of state sign the constitution of the new federation, which they say is committed to Arab socialism and the liberation of Arab territory captured by Israel.

## Middle East Crisis

(See also *Jordan; Syria*)

Aug. 5—Joseph J. Sisco, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, concludes a week of discussions with Israeli leaders on the re-opening of the Suez Canal.

Aug. 9—A Lebanese Army spokesman reports that Israeli forces drove 4 miles into Lebanon today and attacked Palestinian guerrilla bases.

Aug. 13—U.S. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey says that the department has called on Israel and the U.A.R. to avoid any action, including the setting of deadlines, which might threaten the cease-fire which has prevailed along the Suez Canal for the past year.

## Monetary Crisis

(See also *Israel; U.S., Economy*)

Aug. 13—Central banks in Europe and Japan are forced to buy substantial amounts of U.S. dollars to maintain the U.S. dollar at its official minimum rate in their respective countries. The West German mark, the

Canadian dollar and the Dutch guilder, which are "floating" in international markets, all increase in value in relation to the U.S. dollar.

Aug. 17—As a result of U.S. President Richard Nixon's suspension of the U.S. pledge to convert foreign dollar holdings into gold, all foreign exchange markets, with the exception of that of Japan, close; gold trading in the free market is suspended except in Hong Kong, where the price rises from \$44.33 an ounce to \$45.51.

Aug. 23—Volume is light as European foreign exchange markets reopen; the U.S. dollar depreciates slightly in relation to European currencies. In Japan, authorities remain firm in their decision not to revalue the yen; the Bank of Japan maintains the official rate of 360 yen to the U.S. dollar.

Aug. 27—Japanese Finance Minister Mikio Mizuta announces that the yen will be allowed to float within unspecified limits in relation to the U.S. dollar.

Aug. 31—In relation to the U.S. dollar the British pound sterling drops from its August 27 value of \$2.4535 to \$2.4690 on the London foreign exchange. In Tokyo, the yen drops to 339 to the U.S. dollar from the old par value of 360.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *Malta*)

Aug. 20—In Brussels, NATO headquarters announce that the Mediterranean naval headquarters will be moved from Malta to Naples.

### South Pacific Forum

Aug. 7—A communiqué is issued at the conclusion of a 3-day meeting of representatives of Australia and New Zealand and the heads of government of independent Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga and Nauru, and the self-governing Cook Islands. The establishment of the forum, a permanent organization which will convene annually, is announced.

### United Nations

Aug. 3—At a meeting in Geneva of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed, John R. Stevenson, a U.S. State Department legal expert, proposes that the breadth of coastal territorial waters be extended to 12 miles.

Aug. 9—U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and U.N. Secretary General U Thant confer on ways to aid destitute East Pakistanis. Rogers presents a check for \$1 million in U.S. aid to Thant for such work in East Pakistan.

### War in Indochina

Aug. 1—The U.S. command announces that it is pulling back 7 more army units, cutting U.S. troop strength in Vietnam by 2,990.

Aug. 14—The South Vietnamese command reports that yesterday, for the 2d day, enemy forces shelled 8 South Vietnamese positions just south of the demilitarized zone of Vietnam; U.S. B-52 bombers conducted attacks on suspected North Vietnamese positions in the area.

Aug. 16—At a news conference in New York during a 19-day visit to the U.S., Sisowath Sirik Matak, the Acting Premier of Cambodia, says that his government will ask South Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia by June, 1972.

Aug. 17—A spokesman for the U.S. command acknowledges that U.S. B-52's have been conducting raids over the southern half of the DMZ "over a period of the last several months."

Aug. 18—The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand announce that the combat forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam in the next few months. Australia has about 6,000 troops in Vietnam, and New Zealand has about 264 men.

Aug. 19—The U.S. command reports that a task force of the Seventh Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin has been striking North Vietnamese positions in the southern half of the DMZ for the past 6 days.

South Vietnamese troops, supported by



U.S. B-52's, battle enemy forces near the DMZ.

Aug. 25—Following an alert yesterday by the U.S. command which warned of high enemy activity in the next few days, enemy forces shell allied installations in Vietnam.

Aug. 30—A South Vietnamese spokesman reports 51 enemy attacks during the 24-hour period preceding yesterday's election of a new lower house for the South Vietnamese legislature. The attacks were aimed primarily at military targets in the northern provinces.

## AUSTRALIA

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

## BAHREIN

Aug. 14—Sheik Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, the ruler of Bahrein, issues a decree declaring his country to be independent and sovereign; the declaration nullifies a series of treaties with Britain beginning in 1820.

## BOLIVIA

Aug. 19—The government of President Juan José Torres Gonzales, a leftist, declares a state of revolutionary emergency after an anti-government demonstration resulted in fighting.

Aug. 20—Rightist army rebels declare General Hugo Banzer Suárez to be President of Bolivia; fighting continues. Bands of armed workers, students, miners and peasants support Torres. Radio stations controlled by the rebels say that military commanders of 6 of Bolivia's 9 provinces are supporting the rebels.

Aug. 22—Heavy fighting ends after Torres and his supporters flee; Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez, principal organizer of the revolution, assumes the presidency in accord with a decision by the military high command.

Aug. 23—Leftist students, holdouts against the new government, are bombarded by army and air force units at the University of San Andrés; 8 persons are killed.

Aug. 26—Torres and 31 other Bolivians who

had sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy fly to Peru.

## CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, War in Indochina; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## CHAD

Aug. 27—According to a radio broadcast from Fort-Lamy, an attempted coup against the government of President François Tombalbaye has failed; Foreign Minister Baba Hassane announces that Chad has severed diplomatic relations with Libya, which is accused of conspiracy in the plot.

## CHILE

(See also *Colombia*)

Aug. 16—Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, accompanied by a military delegation, arrives for a 1-week official visit.

Aug. 30—Workers seize 2 companies; a U.S. company is a major stockholder in 1 of the companies. Socialist labor leaders threaten to seize the telephone company, 70 per cent of which is owned by the International Telephone and Telegraph Company of the U.S.

## CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See *Turkey; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1—*The New York Times* reports that the Chief of the General Staff of the Army has called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan, Indochina, Korea, Japan and the Philippines.

Aug. 21—*Hsinhua* publishes a Foreign Ministry statement rejecting the idea of "two Chinas" in the United Nations.

## CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)

(See *Turkey; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## COLOMBIA

Aug. 28—After a 3-day visit to Ecuador,

Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens arrives in Bogota for a 5-day visit to Colombia; he is greeted by President Misael Pastrana Borrero.

## **EIRE**

(See also *United Kingdom, Northern Ireland*)

Aug. 23—Prime Minister Jack Lynch and 16 members of the opposition in Northern Ireland's Parliament meet in Dublin. They announce a campaign using nonviolent civil disobedience to achieve the unification of Ireland.

## **FRANCE**

Aug. 14—The Defense Ministry announces the explosion of the 5th in the current series of French nuclear tests.

## **GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)**

Aug. 19—The East German press agency announces that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is in East Berlin and has met with Erich Honecker, the East German Communist party leader.

## **GREECE**

Aug. 26—Premier George Papadopoulos names a new Cabinet.

## **INDIA**

(See also *Pakistan*)

Aug. 9—In New Delhi, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh sign a 20-year treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation which must now be ratified by the legislative bodies of the 2 countries. According to *The New York Times*, Indian officials are interpreting the treaty as meaning that the Soviet Union will come to India's defense in the event of an attack by Pakistan.

## **INDONESIA**

Aug. 7—Partial results of last month's election are announced; the government-

backed Sekber Golkar party won 227 of the 351 contested seats in the House of Representatives.

## **ISRAEL**

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Economy*)

Aug. 22—Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir announces the devaluation of the Israeli pound from 3.50 to 4.20 to the U.S. dollar. Severe price controls are also announced.

Aug. 30—The Israeli defense forces radio station reports that the military government has stopped evacuating Arab refugees from camps in the Gaza strip. Those already removed represent about 6 per cent of the refugees of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war living in the strip.

## **JAPAN**

(See *Intl, Monetary Crisis*)

## **JORDAN**

Aug. 1—At a news conference, Premier Muammar el-Qaddafi reports that a recent meeting to discuss Jordan's treatment of Palestinian commandos (attended by representatives from the U.A.R., Syria, Yemen and Southern Yemen, and Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization) adopted "secret resolutions" for dealing with Jordanian suppression of Palestinian guerrillas.

Aug. 12—Following reported border clashes between Syria and Jordan, Syria severed diplomatic relations with Jordan. A government statement accuses Jordan of engaging in a policy which is inconsistent with the "joint Arab confrontation against the common enemy," Israel. Jordanian planes are also barred from Syrian airspace.

Aug. 14—It is reported that King Hussein has demanded an end to political and economic pressures against his government by other Arab countries as a condition of solution to differences between Jordan and the Palestinian commandos.

Aug. 19—The Presidents of the U.A.R., Libya and Syria hold secret talks in D

masculus with Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian guerrillas, concerning relations with Jordan.

## LAOS

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Aug. 4—In an interview, Acting Defense Minister Sisouk Na Champassak says that he has reduced corruption in the army to a reasonable level; it is reported that command changes will break up the excessive control of the military commanders of the country's 5 command regions.

Aug. 13—The National Assembly passes legislation prohibiting the cultivation, sale, consumption and transportation of opium derivatives.

## LEBANON

Aug. 28—The Communist newspaper, *Al-Nidaa*, reports that under a 5-year, \$52.7-million defense plan approved by Parliament on August 26, Lebanon will purchase arms from the Soviet Union.

## LIBYA

(See *Intl, Federation of Arab Republics; Jordan*)

## MALTA

(See also *Intl, NATO*)

Aug. 16—Speaking in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Dom Mintoff confirms that he has informed the secretariat of NATO that he is terminating arrangements with the alliance.

## MAURITANIA

Aug. 9—Incomplete returns in yesterday's election indicate that Moktar Ould Dad-dah has been elected to his 3d 5-year term as President by a majority of more than 99 per cent.

## MOROCCO

Aug. 4—In a broadcast, King Hassan II announces that he has dismissed his Cabinet and promises to rid the country of corruption.

Aug. 6—King Hassan II names a new govern-

ment of 15 independents; Mohammed Karim Laurani, former Minister of Finance, is the new Premier.

## NEPAL

Aug. 29—King Mahendra reappoints Kirti Nidhi Bista (who resigned on August 26) as Prime Minister for the 3d time.

## PAKISTAN

(See also *India*)

Aug. 4—Fourteen Pakistani diplomats, attached to the embassy in Washington, D.C., or to the U.N. mission, resign from their posts; all 14 are Bengalis and are protesting "crimes against humanity" in East Pakistan by the government of President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan.

Aug. 5—The Pakistani government charges that 100,000 people have died since March 1, 1971, in a "reign of terror unleashed by the Awami League." The Awami League, now banned, pressed for autonomy and then independence for East Pakistan.

Aug. 7—A government announcement says that 88 members of the banned Awami League who were elected to the National Assembly will retain their seats; 79 other Awami League members who were elected to the Assembly will be given the opportunity to clear themselves of charges against them.

Aug. 9—The Martial Law Administrator's office announces that Sheik Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, will be tried by a special military court for "waging war against Pakistan" and other offenses.

Aug. 18—A government spokesman reports that the secret trial of Sheik Mujibur Rahman began on August 11.

## PHILIPPINES

Aug. 21—At a rally of the opposition Liberal party, explosives thrown by terrorists kill 10 persons and injure 66; among the wounded are all 8 of the party's senatorial candidates in the November elections.

Aug. 23—President Ferdinand Marcos an-

nounces that 9 suspected Communist conspirators have been arrested in connection with the bombing at the Liberal party rally.

## RUMANIA

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

## SOUTH AFRICA

Aug. 13—U.S. Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D., Mich.), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and a Negro, and the other members of his committee continue their tour of South Africa.

Aug. 16—President H. Kamuzu Banda of Malawi arrives in South Africa for a state visit; it is the first state visit by a black ruler to South Africa.

Aug. 19—President Banda confers with Prime Minister John Vorster.

## SUDAN

Aug. 2—Sudanese officials say that the counselor of the Soviet Embassy and the Bulgarian Ambassador have been ordered to leave the Sudan; the officials report that the 2 had been in touch with Sudanese Communists who have been charged with plotting last month's unsuccessful leftist coup.

Aug. 3—4 Cabinet members who are former Communists are dismissed. A Soviet Embassy spokesman says that 1,800 Soviet advisers have been ordered to remain in their homes.

Aug. 7—The government announces that 700 more persons identified as members of the Communist party have been arrested.

## SYRIA

(See *Intl. Federation of Arab Republics; Jordan*)

## TURKEY

Aug. 5—A Foreign Ministry spokesman announces that Turkey has recognized Communist China and is severing diplomatic relations with the Taiwan government.

## UGANDA

Aug. 24—President Idi Amin says that Tanzanian forces, led by Chinese officers, have crossed the border into Uganda; fighting ensues. A Tanzanian official charges that Uganda began the attack and denies that Tanzanian forces are led by Chinese.

Aug. 25—An Ugandan official says that his country's troops have driven 10 miles in Tanzania.

Aug. 27—The Uganda government announces a renewal of fighting along the Ugandan-Tanzanian border.

## U.S.S.R.

(See also *India*)

Aug. 2—A communiqué issued at the conclusion of a 1-day meeting attended by all of the top leaders of the Soviet-bloc countries except Rumania expresses grave alarm over the anti-Communist campaign in the Sudan and calls for greater unity in the socialist community.

Aug. 13—The U.S.S.R. ratifies the 20-year friendship treaty with India.

An article in the weekly *Novoye Vremya* attacks Rumania's refusal to join the rest of the Warsaw Pact nations in condemning Communist China's policies.

Aug. 26—A group of 6 non-Communist Israelis, all critics of their government, arrive in Moscow at the invitation of the U.S.S.R. to discuss Soviet-Israeli relations.

## U.A.R.

(See also *Intl. Federation of Arab Republics; Middle East*)

Aug. 5—According to *The New York Times*, President Anwar el-Sadat has told the Soviet Union that the U.A.R. will continue to resist communism in the Arab world.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Great Britain

Aug. 6—Following a meeting yesterday between Prime Minister Edward Heath and Brian Faulkner, the Prime Minister

Northern Ireland, the British government announces that it will increase the number of troops in Northern Ireland by 1,800 men.

Aug. 19—Prime Minister Heath replies to a telegram from John Lynch, the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic, and asserts that there must not be interference in the affairs of the United Kingdom. The Lynch telegram warned that unless Britain gave up trying to find “military solutions” to the problems in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic would support the “policy of passive resistance” by the opposition.

## **lornthern Ireland**

Aug. 9—The government invokes emergency powers of preventive detention; more than 300 men are seized by police and the British army. It is reported that members of the Irish Republican Army are the main targets of the detention policy. Fierce rioting by Roman Catholics follows.

Aug. 11—Violence continues; at least 21 civilians and 2 British soldiers have died in the past 3 days as a result of the rioting.

Aug. 13—Prime Minister Brian Faulkner accuses the Irish Republican government of tacit support of the outlawed Irish Republican Army and of seeking to overthrow the Protestant-dominated government of Northern Ireland.

Aug. 14—British troops, seeking to prevent terrorist infiltration and the continuing flow of arms from the Irish Republic, move toward the border separating Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

Aug. 24—Prime Minister Faulkner asserts that the government of Northern Ireland will stand firm against attempts to unify the 2 Irelands.

## **UNITED STATES**

### **ivil Rights**

Aug. 3—In a White House statement issued today, President Richard Nixon directs Attorney General John Mitchell and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot Richardson to work with individual school districts to hold busing of school

children to the minimum required by law. Nixon reaffirms his opposition to busing “school-children to achieve a racial balance.” The President disavows a plan for the part-time desegregation of public schools in Austin, Texas, by relying on heavy busing to achieve racial balance. On April 20, 1971, the Supreme Court upheld the use of busing to achieve school desegregation and eliminate dual systems of education.

Aug. 6—12 Black Panthers are found not guilty of attempting to murder 5 New Orleans policemen in a shootout on September 15, 1970. The trial was conducted by a Negro judge, and 10 of the 12 jurors were Negroes.

Aug. 9—A 3-judge federal court in Buffalo rules unconstitutional a New York State law establishing a 1-year residency requirement for welfare recipients because it violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

Aug. 11—White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler says that the President has informed the Justice Department and HEW that school busing to achieve racial balance should not exceed the minimum required by law. Ziegler warns that those who are not responsive to the President’s directives “will find themselves involved in other assignments or quite possibly in assignments other than the Federal Government.”

Alabama Governor George Wallace sends a telegram to President Nixon urging him to ask the federal courts to outlaw busing for desegregation purposes.

The United States Civil Rights Commission says that President Nixon’s policy of minimum busing for integration purposes will undermine efforts to desegregate schools.

Aug. 13—Governor Wallace orders an Alabama school board to disregard federal court orders and reopen a predominantly Negro school under a freedom-of-choice plan. He challenges the President to issue orders to halt busing nationwide.

Aug. 18—The Justice Department files a brief with Associate Supreme Court Justice



Hugo Black supporting the Corpus Christi, Texas, school board's request for a stay of a federal court order to integrate the school district; the plan calls for massive busing of students.

Aug. 20—Attorney General Mitchell rejects a plan for reapportioning Louisiana's legislative districts on the ground that the plan would discriminate against Negroes.

Aug. 30—As most of the public schools in the South open, many of them on a desegregated basis for the first time, no major incidents are reported.

According to *The New York Times*, an official report by a 15-member human relations team has been presented to the Air Force Training Command; the report charges widespread discrimination at Air Force training bases.

## Economy

(See also *Intl, Monetary Crisis; U.S., Labor*)

Aug. 2—Four major steel companies follow the action of the United States Steel Corporation which announced price increases to take effect on a staggered schedule between August 5 and December 1. The increases cover nearly all types of steel products and will raise prices an average of 8 per cent.

Aug. 6—The Labor Department reports that the unemployment rate for July was 5.8 per cent after allowing for seasonal adjustment.

Aug. 15—President Nixon announces a major overhaul of his economic policies in a nationwide television and radio broadcast. He orders a 90-day freeze on wages and prices and establishes a Cost of Living Council to administer the freeze and to recommend methods of stabilization to follow the freeze; he says that the U.S. will no longer convert foreign-held dollars into gold; he announces a 10 per cent surcharge on all imports except those that are not subject to duties and those that are limited by quotas; he reduces federal spending for the current fiscal year by \$4.7 billion; he asks Congress to repeal the 7 per

cent automobile excise tax and to establish a 1-year investment tax credit of 10 per cent.

Aug. 16—The General Motors Corporation rescinds the price increases, planned for 1972 cars, that were announced on August 5.

Aug. 18—Speaking in Ohio, President Nixon says that the international elements of his new economic policy are designed to result in a revaluation of the world's currencies.

Aug. 23—Following a ruling by the State Attorney General that he does not have the authority to set aside the President's wage freeze, Texas Governor Preston Smith (D) agrees to defer the scheduled pay increases for state employees.

The President's Cost of Living Council rules that insurance companies may increase premiums if the increases were announced before August 15.

Aug. 26—In New York City, the Chemical Bank, the 6th largest bank in the U.S., announces a reduction of about 1 per cent on consumer loans and one-half per cent for mortgages, in voluntary support of President Nixon's economic program. The freeze does not apply to interest rates.

Aug. 28—The executive director of the Cost of Living Council announces new guidelines for prices and wages that fluctuate seasonally; provisions are made under the guidelines for adjustments during the freeze period for such wages, prices and rents.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, U.N., War in Indochina*)

Aug. 2—Secretary of State William Rogers announces that the U.S. supports the seating of Communist China in the United Nations but that it continues to oppose the expulsion of the Taiwan-based government of Nationalist China.

A staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments is made public. The report reveals that the Central Intelligence Agency maintains a 30,000-man "irregular" army which is now fighting throughout most

Laos. The force is supplemented by Thai "volunteers" who are paid by the C.I.A.

Aug. 4—In a news conference, President Richard Nixon cautions against expecting an immediate détente with China or an end to the Vietnam war as a result of his trip to China. He says that the U.S. should step up aid to Pakistan and India (where millions of East Pakistanis have taken refuge) rather than apply pressure to Pakistan to aid the victims in East Pakistan. He states that the U.S. will remain neutral in the upcoming elections in South Vietnam.

Aug. 5—In a 219-to-140 vote, the House approves and sends to the President a bill which would give him discretion in approving trade with specific Communist countries through Export-Import Bank financing of U.S. exports.

Aug. 6—Senator J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicates that the committee intends to proceed with its effort to cut off funds for the foreign military assistance program if the Defense Department does not provide the committee with the current 5-year plan for military assistance. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that the department has no such plan.

Aug. 9—The Commerce Department reveals that 2 licenses have been granted for the shipment of \$162 million worth of equipment for a truck-manufacturing complex in the U.S.S.R.

Aug. 10—Lieutenant General Sisowath Sirik Matak, Acting Premier of Cambodia, confers with President Nixon at the White House.

Aug. 18—The Controller General of the U.S. rules that funding of foreign military aid will cease on September 1 if the Defense Department does not comply with the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Aug. 31—President Nixon, invoking executive privilege, refuses to disclose to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Defense Department's 5-year plan for military assistance.

A State Department spokesman announces that the U.S. has extended recognition to the new military government of Bolivia.

A State Department spokesman reports that the U.S. has been advised that Cuba wants to terminate the U.S.-financed air lift that brings refugees from Cuba to the U.S.

## Government

(See also *U.S., Economy, Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 3—In a 46- to 44-vote, the Senate passes and sends to the President an appropriations bill that provides \$4.1 billion for the Commerce, State and Justice Departments; included is \$450,000 for the Subversive Activities Control Board.

Aug. 6—Before Congress begins a 1-month recess, the Senate passes and sends to the President a \$29-billion bill to finance the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare, and Labor, and a bill appropriating \$1 billion to finance emergency public service jobs. The Senate also approves legislation to continue financing, at present levels, departments for which regular appropriations bills have not yet been passed.

George P. Shultz, director of the Office of Management and Budget, issues a bulletin directing departments to limit promotion of government workers to cut costs and set standards for private industry.

Visiting a nursing home in New Hampshire, President Nixon announces a series of steps using federal funds for supervising and improving conditions in nursing homes around the nation.

Aug. 9—President Nixon signs the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 which provides \$1 billion for public service jobs. He also signs legislation permitting the government to guarantee \$250 million in bank loans to corporations whose failure would seriously impair the economy; the entire amount is expected to go to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Aug. 17—Speaking at a Knights of Columbus meeting in New York, President Nixon

urges support for his new economic program; he says that Roman Catholics can count on his support to prevent the closing of financially troubled parochial schools.

## Labor

(See also *U.S., Economy*)

Aug. 1—The United Steelworkers of America approves a new 3-year contract which calls for average wage increases of somewhat more than 30 per cent; a threatened strike is called off.

Aug. 2—The rail strike ends when the United Transportation Union and the railroads reach an agreement which calls for a 42 per cent wage increase over a 42-month period; the agreement also includes work rule changes and submission of disputes to binding arbitration.

Aug. 18—Leonard Woodcock, president of the United Automobile Workers, says that the union will file suit to test the government's right to make unions give up wage increases that are scheduled to go into effect during the 90-day freeze.

Harry Bridges, president of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, says that the union will continue its strike of West Coast docks despite government requests to halt strikes during the 90-day freeze period.

Aug. 19—George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., says that his labor organization will refuse to cooperate in the wage-price freeze.

Aug. 25—Woodcock says that the U.A.W. will try to "accommodate" itself to the 90-day freeze, even though it is opposed to Nixon's economic program.

Aug. 26—In Washington, D.C., lawyers representing affiliates of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. meet to discuss ways to combat the President's 90-day wage and price freeze; according to *The New York Times*, the union lawyers are "cautious" about initiating a large-scale court attack to test the validity of the freeze.

## Military

Aug. 16—Secretary of the Army Robert

Froehlke says that as an initial step in the 50,000-man troop reduction called for in pending Selective Service legislation, the Army will begin releasing 43,000 men up to 4 months early.

Aug. 20—The commander of the Third Army orders the life sentence of First Lieutenant William Calley, Jr., reduced to 20 years. In March, 1971, Calley was found guilty of having murdered 22 civilians in My Lai, South Vietnam, in 1968.

## Politics

(See also *U.S., Civil Rights*)

Aug. 5—Alabama Governor George Wallace says that he has decided to run for the presidency in 1972.

Aug. 11—Mayor John V. Lindsay of New York switches his political allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic party.

## Supreme Court

Aug. 31—In an opinion in which he refuses to stay enforcement of a lower court ruling ordering busing to achieve racial balance in a school system in North Carolina, Chief Justice Warren Burger says that lower court judges must not interpret the Supreme Court opinion to mean that racial balance is required in every school.


## VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Aug. 20—General Duong Van Minh withdraws as a presidential candidate; he charges that the elections are rigged; his withdrawal leaves President Nguyen Van Thieu as the only candidate in the election scheduled for October 3, 1971.

Aug. 21—Reversing an earlier ruling, the Supreme Court agrees to permit Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky's name to appear on the ballot in the presidential election.

Aug. 23—Ky announces that he will not run for the presidency.

Aug. 30—Early returns from yesterday's election for a new lower house of the legislature indicate some gains for anti-government candidates; President Thieu is expected to maintain his majority in the lower house.



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